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　　In　my　recent　essay”A，Buddhistic曾Reinterpretation　of　Karl　Barth曾s
Argument　for　the　Existence　of　God　in．Anselm．・Fides　euaerens　ln彪llectum”1
1have　demonstrated　that　Anse㎞’s　Name　of　God，　aliguid　quo「’nihil”maius
ωg1剛po∬’∫，　can　be　reinte叩reted　Bud（ihistically　in　terms　df　Nagaijuna，s
notion　of脚Empt血ess鯉in　reference　to　the　Proslogion　II　and　III．　The　fbrmer，
which　B舳，　Hartshorne，　amd　Malcolm　ca皿Anselm　I，　can　be　critiqued，　as　by
Kant．　The　latter　or　Anselm　II　is　nevertheless　tellable．　For　Anselm曾s　Deity　is
”loyal”to　Emptiness　emptying　itselC　thereby　paradoxically　coming　out　to
”be”　the　only　one　in　the　Universe　who　can　call　fonh　loyalty　in　us．2
　　That　essay　was　preceded　by　a　more　general，　philosophical　reflection　on
”How　Can　Principles　Be　More　Than　Just　Epistomological　Or　Conceptual？：
Anselm，　Naga巾na，　and　Whitehead”3dealing　with　the　issue　of
convenibility　of　principles　into　realities．　In　this　first　attempt　at　conside］ring
Anselm　in　comparison　with　other　thinkers，　such　as　Nagaljuna　and
Whitehead，　I　was　motivated　to　leam　the　philosophical　grounds　fbr　the
scientific　use　of　pri皿cipIes　in　reference　to　their　convertibility　into　realities．
　　In　still　another　of　my　recellt　essays（actUally，　the　third　one）on　Anselm
and　Buddhist　wisdom，”lgnorance－Christian　and　Buddhist：Reinterpreting
A血selm’s　？roslogt’on　rV　in　Light　of　D．　T．　Suzuki°s　Zen　Thought，’141have
dealt　with　the　problem　qズ傭ψ蜘∫（the　Fool）in　the　Proslogion　IV（which
Bart2i　designates　llThe　Possibility　of　Denying　the　Existence　of　God”）in　light
of　Suzuki，s　Zell　thought　which　culminates　in　the　fbllowing　dicum：
”Ignorance　is　the　negation　of　Enlighte］㎜ent　a血d　not　the　reverse．闘
　　Now，　in　this　fburth　essay　on　Anselm　and　Buddllism　I　will　first　discuss，
with　Karl　Banh　and　Gregory　Schufreider，　how　Anselmls　argument　aiming　at
2fUlfilling　the　request　upon　God　in　the　Proslogion　I　to”show　Yourself，　is
shot　through　with　the　procedure　of　reasonillg　evolving　in　itself　the　sort　of
understallding　which　admits　reason　to　a　vision　of　the　matter　itself（i．e。，　God）
or　what　Barth　designates”divine　illuminare，”based　upon”divine　donare，”
resulting　in　the四G7「aticzs　tibi，　bone　4∂〃zi〃θ．，，
　　Second，1，　again，　will　scrutinize　and　reinterpret　Anselmls　procedure　at　its
very　outset（namely，　the　Name　of　God　as　aliquid　quo　nihil　maius　cogt’tari
po∬it），　however，　by　reference　to　Suzuki曾s　clarification　of　the　Zen　mondo
（questioll　and　answer）as　involving　in　itself　what　he　calls　soku－hi　logic，”A　is
not－A　Imd　therefbre　A　is　A，”in　which吻゜nana（㎞owledge）is　neverゆoηα
without　pア復ノna（wisdom）；prq／na　is　the　necessary　postulate　of吻’nana・
Thus，　Anselm’s　final　gratitude　to　God，”Gratias　tibi，伽e　domine，ll　will　be
verified　as　being　deepened　by　its　inclusion　of　Zen　logic　of、pral’na（or　sokzt－hゴ
10gic）while　proceeding　because　ofreason’s　vision　or　revelation．
　　Third，　concomitant　with　this　double　nature　of　Anselm，s　gratitude　to　God　is
the　emergence　of　my　Buddhist－Christiall　theology　of　loyalty　as　a　viable　way
of　doillg　theology　hl　a　neo－Anselmian　way．
1．Reason，s　Vision　of　the　Thing　Itself　（id　ipsum卯oゴ螂β｛k　deusl　esの：
Anse且m●s　Proof　of　the　Existence　of　God　and　Its　Native　Soil
l．On　the　Surjワassalガliりノof　the　Dθゴリハー－pro　et　con’Barth，　Hartshorne，　and
My　Own　View
　　As　is　well㎞own，　Anselm，s　argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God　culminates
in　the　following　passage　in　Proslogion　IV：
DetLS・e伽est　id　qUO〃miUS　COgt’伽゜η0ηρ0鰍ρ解049厩伽e・inte〃∫9屡゜t，
吻ue　intelligt”磁躰麗脚’cθ∬¢漉ηεc　oρ脚伽ε9祝α励oη螂ε．ρ厩
e「go　intセ”’91’t　sic｛zsse　Deu”霧，ηθ9㍑∫’θ〃〃z　non　esse‘09　jtare．（1104，2fめ
For　God　is，that　beyond　which　nothillg　grea重er　can　be　conceivedl．　Whoever
miy　knows　ti）at　knows　that　it　eXists　in　such　a　way　that　even　in　thought　it
camot　but　exist．　And　so　whoever　knows　that　this　is　the’　manner　of　God曾s
eXistence　camnot　conceive　him　as　not　existing．
Barth　interprets　this　passage　in　the　spirit　of　confessio　laudis　or　adoration，1
3might　say．”What　does　it　mean　to　know－to　know｛and　recognize－God
himself，”　asks　Barth　only　to　come　to　this　position：”Anselm　goes　back　to　his
argumentum．　God　is　he　who　revealing　himself　as　Creator，　is　called　quo
maius　eogitari　nequit　and　therefore　who　immediately　con丘onts　us　with　his
Name　as　the　one　who　fbrbids　us　to　conceive　a　greater　than　him”（AFQI，
169）．In　a　word，　Barth’　vision　of　the　Deity　which　he　obtains　from　Anselm，s
Name　of　God　as　aliguid　quo　nihil　maius　cogitari　po∬”（or　what　is　here
designated　asゴd　quo　maius　cogitari　non、possit）is　a　negativistically
sovereign　one；that　is，　it　preserves　itself　as　a　supremely　lofty　vision　of　being
insofar　as　it　negates　all　other　things（i．e．，　creatures）while　fbfbidding　us　to
conceive　a，lgreater［maius】than　him．”
　　In　so　saying，　Barth　definitely　denies　the　surpassability　of　the　Deity　in　an．ア
sense．　However，　as　I　demonstrated　elsewhere，6　God　is　sulpassable－」at　least
by　Godself　in　lwo　senses：by　the　innermost　beyond－essence　of　the　Deity（as
the　intra－Trinitarian　relationality，ρθ7’c乃oz顔∫which　Meister　Echhart
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　xdesignatesハ［ichits　as　compared　with　divine　persδ五ae；and　which　I　identifン
with　Buddhist　Emptiness　emptying　itself）and　by　the　quality　of　the　Deity；fbr
God，　according　to　Charles　Hartshome，　is　to　be　conceived　as　capable　of
i血cluding”quantity　in　His　quality，　without　the　qualltity　being　that
presumably　impossible　th血g，　an　unsurpassable　quantity．”7
　　1n　Hartshome°s　case，　what　he　envisions　is　the　fact　that　ll［t］he　divine
quantity　will　be　surpassable，　but　only　by　God　Himself，（AD，29）．　The　all－
illclusive　concrete　God－now，　is　surpassable　insofar　as　the　nature　of　God
grows　in　relationship　to　the　quality　of　God　who　calls　us　fbrward　into　the
future　ever　anew－and　this　while　absorbing　into　his　bosom　all　new
experiences　in　the　world　occuning　in　dual　response　to　the　div壼ne　quality　and
the　past．　Yet，　this　vision　of　the　Deity　is　not　there　ill　Allselmls　original
argument　in　which”［t］he　exclusion　of　quantity　and　becoming　from　God　is
decisive”（AD，31）．　Anselm　and　Barth　share　in　the　view　of　God　which
Hartshorne　critically　evaluate　in　these　terms：”A　God　unsurpassable，　even　by
Himself，　is　a　pure’absolute’，　wholly　unreceptive　or　insensitive　toward　the
world”（AD，30）．　While　appreciating　Anselm，s　discovery，　Hartshome
nevertheless　declares：”Allselm　discovered，　and　really　discovered，　the　modal
uniqueness　of　the　idea　of　God．　What　he　overlooked，　and　nearly　all　his
critics　equally　fail　to　see，　is　that，　s血ce　ac加ality　can血ot　be　necessary，　there
4
must　be　a　real　duality　in　God，　as　in　no　other　being，　between　necessary
existence　and　contingent　actuality”（AD，134）．
　　In　my　own　case，　the　quality　of　God（which　is　identifiable　with
Whitehead，s　notion　of　the　primordial　nature　of　God　and　which　is　perceived
by　Hartshome　as　surpassing　the　quantity　of　God）is　fUrther　su叩assable　by
what　Anselm　calls　”nihil　maius”－the　metaphysical　ultimate，　Nothingness　or
Buddllist　Emptiness　which　is”greater，”metaphysically，　than　the　Personal
Deity．8　Hence，　I　propose　to　say，　first，　that　God　is　loyal　to　the”nihil　maius”
or　Nothingness　Greater．
　　Yet，　I　propose　to　put　fbrward，　in　the　second　place，　that　Nothingness
Greater　is　not　Something　insofar　as　it　negates　itself；　and　this　is　the　wisdom　I
learn　from　Buddhists　that　can　be　traCed　back　to　Nagarjuna蜜s　doctrine　of
”Emptiness　emptying　itself’（璽lHow　Can　Principles，ll　93－97）．
　　Signi且cantly　enough，　Anselm　himself　seems　to　be　susceptible　of　sharing
this　wisdom　with　Buddhists．　According　to　Desmond　Paul　Hellry，　the　only
way　in　which　”nihil”　has　a　meaning　for　Anselm　is　to曾曾deny　that　it　is　a　name，
insofar　as　its　significative　fUnctions　are　concerned．”91f　so，”nゴhil”（nothing）
has，　as　Hellry　explicates，　a　two－fbld　significative　fUnctio11，　remotive　and
constitutive，　neither　of　which　is　naming．　Thus　Henry　concludes：
”Remotively（removendo），nihir＝lnothingl　effects　the　complete　removal
from　its　import　of　every　object　which　is　something；constitutively
（constituendo），　therefbre，　the　meaning　which　it　establishes　is　’no　thing　at　alll
or雪no　thing　that　is　something口1（CDC，337）．　In　other　words，　to　refer　to　my
own　interpretation，　remotively，”nihil”＝”110thing，，　signifies　something
（which　is　therefbre　to　be　negated）；and，　constitutively，　it　signifies　nothillg
（which　is　rather　to　be　recognized　as　the　relatedness　as　such　of　ultimate
reality，　nihib．
　　F耐hermore，　in　the　third　place，　let　me　call　your　attention　to　the　fact，
which　is　thorough－and－through　Christian　in　its　essence，　that　God　is　the　only
one　in　the　universe　who　can　call　fbrth　loyalty，　faith，　or　obedience　in　us
creatures．　Ithink　this　triadic　idea　of　a　theology　of　loyalty　has　been
demonstrated　in　a　convincing　manner　in　my　2004　essay　on”A曾Buddhistic°
Reinterpretation　of　Karl　Barth，s　Argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God　in
・4η3θ加’・Fides　S2uaerens　lnte〃ectum，，　mentioned　earlier．
　　The　net　result　of　my　argument　thus　far　is　this：that　since　God　in　the　third
5step　in　my　triadic　picture　of　a　theology　of　loyalty　appears　as　the　one　who
evokes　loyalty　ill　us，　God　fbrbids　us　with　justice　to　conceive　a”greater　thall
him”　in　the　form　of　any　me蜘of　the　community　of　worldly　actUalities，　but
not　in　the　senses　of　God　Himself　and　Buddhist　Empti血ess．　Here，　I　might
say，　lies　the　ratiollale　of　perceiving　that　the　diville　prohibition　Anselm
espouses　is　not　really　incompatible　with　an　interreligious　dialogue　with
Buddllism．
　　Be　that　as　it　may，1　would　prefer　to　say，　on　the　one　hand，　positively　that
God　urges　us　to　conceive　Nothing　Greater　than　him．　Hence，　we　can　say，　on
the　other，　in　a　negative　manner　that　God　forbids　us　to　conceive　a　greater　than
him．　In　between　these　two　statements，　one　positive　and　the　other　negative，
there　lies　a　mystery：why　an　urging　God　has　tumed　illto　a　fbrbidding　God．
One　thing　is　llow　clear：while　urging　us　to　conceive　Nothing　Greater，　God　is
the　one　who　has　shown　his　loyalty　by　conceiving　Nothing　Greater　than　him．
And　this　is　the　pre－condition　of　his　sovereignty　of　fbfbiddhlg　us　any　sort　of
idolatry．
　　In　this　who豆e　state　of　affairs，　however，　it　is　of　course　pivotal　that　Nothing
Greater　is　not　Something　but　Emptiness　emptying　itself圏the　insight　which
lies　at　the　core　of　Buddhist　wisdom　which　Anselm　seems　to　share，　as　I
mentioned　above．　Let　us　recall　at　this　juncture　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　succinct
summary　of　Buddhist　wisdom：”Indeed，　Ignorance　is　the　negation　of
Enlightenment　and　not　the　reverse．，uo　Emptiness　empties　itselfL－thus
awakening　us，　God　and　creatures　alike，　to　Enlightenment　which　lies　at　the
bottom　of　any　and　every　person’s　existence　as　reality　in　itSelf，　even　reality　as
relatedness　as　such．
　　The　fbregoing　is　a　description　of　Anselm，s　intuition　as　it　is　combined　with
what　I　interpret　as　Buddhist　wisdom　in　te皿s　of　my　thesis　of　a　Buddhist－
Christian　theology　of　loyalty．　If　this　intuition　is　prepared，　then　A皿selm’s
argument　for　the　Existence　of　God，　as　it　is　elaborated　upon　by　Barth，　appears
convincingly　clear　as　in　the　following：
To　know　that［i．e．，　the　fact　that　GOd　forbidS　us　to　conceive　a　greater　than
l血1】prop飯ly　isめ㎞ow吻〃04　D鋸観，（oOd　hirnseif．　in　this　his　Name　as
Lord　he　himseif　is　and　is　known，　known　in　such　a　way　that　the　denial　of　his
Existence　becomes　inlpossible　and止ereby　the　proof　of　his　Existence　is
6n曲vahd．　The1ef（｝re，　bene　inte〃igere　is　not　to　be　immediately　equated　a
ρηbη゜With　in彪lligere此」脚麗η29〃04鷹est．　But血血e　sense　of　our　passage
bene　in彪鵡g召陀is　lhe　fUlfilhnenいhe　developmenちthe　manner　of血is　real
㎞owledge，　which　by　itS　relation　to　the（）bject　establishes　itSelf　as　true．　It
consistS　concretely血the伽t血t血e㎝b｛㎎o　con㎞ed血血e　Name　of
（㎞is　hear（乳recognized　and　obeyed　and　that　therefbre血his　th血iking　man
allows　God　to　be　God．（AFQI，169）
　　What　is　conspicuous　in　the　above　passage　is　that　Barth　opts　fbr　a
developmental　view　ofゐε〃θintelligere．　His　is　a　view　of　llegating　the
immediate　equation　a　priori　of　bene　intelligere　with　intelligere　id　ipsum
quod　res　est．　But　how　is　this　so？Answerillg　this　question　is　not　an　easy
task，　it　seems　to　me．　For　in　order　to　answer　this　question　adequately　we
need　to　distillguish　in　proper　temls　between　contemplation（or　insight）and
development（or　proof）as　they　are　inherent　in　the　problem　ofわθηθ
ゴntelligere　or　a　right血l　understanding．　Let　us　see　in　the　fbllowing　passage
how　Barth　refers　to　what　he　regards　as　the　pre－condition　of　the　development
or　proof　of　the　Existence　of　God：
ln　his　very　thoughtS，　precisely　in　the血nitation　of　his　fteedom　of　thought．
A皿piety　and　morality　are　no血ing　worth，　have　no血ing　to　do　with　God　and
can　even　be　atheistic　or　may　become　atbeistic　again　unless　they　are　dire　cted
towards　es励hs㎞g　m　absol鵬㎞i倣i㎝on面s，1he　most血ward｛and　most
血tirnate　area　of　fteedom．　Bene　intelligere　means：tO　know　once　and　for　a皿，
aS　a　rea1　OX　knOwS　itS　maSter　Or　a　trUe　aSS　itS　maSter’S　Stall．β｛加θ∫η纐9ε彫
means：丘nally　to　realize　that　it　is　not　possible　to　th血k　beyond　God，　not
possible　to　t止血k　as　a　spectatOr　of　oneself　or　of　G（xd，　that　all　thin1Ci　lg　abOut
GOd　has　to　begin　Wit　1　thinking　tr）God．（AFQI，169）
　　Here　it　is　revealed　that　what　is　central　to　Barth，s　theological　concem，
based　upon　his　research　into　Anselm’s　proof　of　the　Existence　of　God，　is　a
new　orientation　in　God－talk　whereby　thinking　to　God　is　clearly
differentiated　from　thinking　about　God．　Accordingly，　it　is　important　for　him
to　add　to　the　above　passage　a　few　words　clarifンing　his　intention：”That　is
what　the　fbol　and　also　his　advocate　Gaunilo　have　not　yet　realized．　Those
7who　have　realized　it，　by　so　doing，　stand　under　the　compulsion　of　knowledge
of　God，s　Existence”（AFQI，169）．　The　motif　of　the　unsurpassability　or
sovereignty　of　the　Deity　vis－a－vis　cregtures　ll　is　resonant　here　again　in
B舳雪stheology，　re－conf㎞血g　wit　lin　t　le　context　of　Anselm　stUdies　what
he　began　putting　fbmlard　in　his　maiden　work，　Der　Rb’merbrief（1919），　with
these　words：
The　justification　of　our　prayer　is　not　what　we　have　attained　some　higher
eminence　on　the　ladder　of　prayer，　f～）r　aU　1困ders　of　pfayer　ale　e戯ed　within
the　sphere　of　No－God曾of　this　world．　The　justification　of　our　prayer　and　the
reality　Qf　our　comm皿ion　with　God　are　gro皿ded　upon　the伽血that
Another，　the　Etemal，　the　Second　Man　fr（）m　Heaven（I　Cor．　xv，47），　stands
before　God　pre一㎝in㎝［in　power乏md－in　our　place．12
　　Ba曲，s　clarification　of　the　unsu1passability　of　the　Deity　notWithstanding，　I
opt　for　its　critical　revisions　in　terms　of　the’　su叩assability　of　the　Deity　by
Himself（first，　by　the　quality　of　God，　as　elucidated　by　Hartshome；and
second，　by　Buddhist　Emptiness　or　the　intra－Trinitarian　Godhead　asハlichts，
as　proposed　by　me），　as　has　been　discussed　earlier．　I　presuppose　these　two
cases　of　God，s　being　surpassable　in　order　for　God　to　be　re－affirmed　as
unsurpassable　by　creatures．　The　net　result　is　the　same　reverence　fbr　God’s
being　unsurpassable　whether　in　the　cases　of　Hartshorne　and　me，　on　the　one
hand，　or　in　Ba曲曾s　case，　on　the　other，　yet　it　is　important　to　acknowledge　the
depths　of　insight　into　the　Divine　loyalty　to　Nothingness　Greater［nihil〃laius］
lying　at　the　back　of　the　Divine　unsurpassability　or　sovereignty　or
irreVerSibility．
　　This　whole　state　of　affairs，　let　me　propose，　covers　the　problem　of
”thinking　to　God”or　prayer　which　is　the　native　soil　of　Anse㎞，s　argument
fbr　the　Existence　of　God．　Accordingly，　thinking　to　God　or　prayer　or
intuition　gives　rise　to　its　development　or　thought　or　argument　fbr　the
Existence　of　God．　Hence，　Barth　writes：
舳d㎞磁ly　and　p細ly　ofthat　eXistence　of　God　which　belongs　only
tO　hirn　amongSt　all　that　eXistS，　his　3たesse，　the　eXistence　which　cannot　be
amuned　even　in　mere出ought．　Once　more　Imd　with　no　ambig晦A【鵬㎞
8謎escl曲t出e㎜w司一do㎜㎞fof鰯3，血ep㎜fof臨c
θ∬e，the　proof　that　it　is　irnpOssible　for　GOd　to　be　conceived　as　not　existing，　is
what　he　und㎝舳ds　by㎞owledge｛md　proof　of　God°s　EXistence．　With　the
bene　intelligere　of　the　diVine　Name　a，God，　who　as　God　can　be　conceived　as
not　eXisting　is　cast　out　and　room　made　for　the　GOd　of　faith，　ofrevelation　and
of　the　Church　who　so　exists　that　he　makes　even　the　thought　of　his　non－
eXistence　impossible．（AFQI，169－170）
　　Thus，　inherent　in　the　proof　of　the　Existellce　of　God　is　the　process　of
’casting　out　of　a曾曾God　who　as　God　ca血be　conceived　as　not　existing”or　of
our　ignorance　which，　according　to　D．　T．　Suzuki，”is　the　negation　of
Enlightenment　and　not　the　reverse．”i3　And　this　process　of　casting　out　of　the
idea　of　a　non－existent　Deity，　a血idea　concomitant　with　our　ignorance，　can
only　take　place　by　virtue　of　a　real　Deity　who　is　loyal　to　the　Nothillgness
（｝reater，酌θrψアparadoxたallytending　to　be　the　one　who　evokes　our　loyalty，
that　is，　our　willingness　to　stand　under　the　compulsion　of　the　Existence　of
God，　result血9　in　the　ex㏄ution　of　the　Proof　l4．
2．　Theハ「at’ve　50’J　of1lnse’〃8「s　P’oρノρノ’」he　Ex’stence　6ゾGod，
Contemp伽ion：　Schufrelder’s　Anselm　vs．　Luther
　　As　we　have　ascertained　thus　far，　the　problem　of　bene　in彪lligere（町right血1
understanding）is　solved　by　Barth　in　a　developmental　manner　in　co皿ectioll
with漉〃∫gθrθ∫4伽π加）guod　res（’．θ．，　deus）est（㎜derstanding　that　which
the　thing　itself［God］is）．　Barth’s　developmenta1　view　of　the　bene　inte〃igere
reminds　me　of　Martin　Lutherls　understanding　of　the”deum加峨cα7θ”or
acknowledgment　of　God，s　righteousness　which　lies　at　the　heart　of　his
doctri血e　ofjustification．
　　In・Lectures　o〃Roma〃s，　Luther　speaks　of　the　motif　of　the　justification　of
God（deumゴ麗訂爺cαアθ）with　a　specific　fbcus　on　the　fighteousness”by　virtue
of　which　God，　being　righteous，　makes　us　righteous，　and　he　alone　is
righteousness　with　respect　to　usノ曹According　to　Luther，　God　as　he　is　in
himself　can　be　justified　by　none　because　he　is　justice　itself－that　is，　the
”righteousness　by　vi血le　of　which　he　is　righteous　in　himse豆f”15
　　As　is　most　expressly　articulated　by　Rudolf　Herma皿in　the　article”Das
Verhalmis　von　Rechtfertigung　und　Gebet　nach　Luthers　Ausleg覧mg　von　R6m．
93in　der　R6merbriefVorlesung，”16　this　motif　of　the　justification　of　God　cuts
across　Luther’s　whole　discussion　of　justification　as　it　operates　on　its
subjective　axis，　prayer．　Refening　to　Romans　3：4，　Luther　states，”The　Greek
text　reads：’God　shall　be　truthfUl曾or’Let　God　be　tnlth血［1．l　These　words　give
expression　not　so　much　to　the　tmth血lness　of　God　as　to　a　confession　of　the
truthfUlness　of　God．　What　they　mean　is　this：It　is　right　that　all　should
confess　and　admit　that　God　is　tmthfU1”（LR，63－64）．
　　The　basis　fbr　this　act　ofjustification　of　God　by　the　believer，　in　my　view，　is
God’s　manifestation　of　his　own　justice，　righteousness，　or　truthfUlness　in　his
words　that　took　shape　in　the　Incamation，　that　is，　the　Christ　event．17　This
state　of　affair幽s　is　precisely　in　parallel　with　Anselm，s　idea　of　bene　intelligere
mentioned　above，　as　far　as　I　can　see．　Thus，　Anselm，s　argument　fbr　the
Existence　of　God　can　be　grasped　as　confessional　in　nature　in　the　Luthera血
sensc　of”confessio、peccati”because　it　involves　the　process　of　casting　out　a
false　Deity　who　is　non－existent　and　who　resides，　I　might　say，　in　the　midst　of
our　ignorance－alld　this　while　thinking　to　God．　However，　the　basis　fQr　this
confessional　procedure　of　the　argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God，　in
Anselm，s　case，　is　a　real　insight（”bene　intelligere”at　its　core）into　the
in血ermost　nature　of　the　Deity　or　of　what　Luther　calls　God　as　he　is　in　himself
or　deus　nudus［the　naked　God］．　Here　Luther’s　theology　is　to　be　broken
through　ad　intra．
　　Now，　it　may　be　in　order　fbr　me　to　pay　due　attention　to　Gregory
Schufヤeider，s　explication　of　the　passage　in　question　in　IV．　First，1et　me
quote　again　Anselm’s　text－this　time　together　with　its　translation　by
Schufreider：
Dε鉱∫enimθ∫’此J　qUO〃laius　COgt’伽η0η、potest．　（如J　gε4」わeηε加詑”t’8t’t，
吻頗惚〃頓゜磁勿π硲∫Cθ∬¢蜘θCCρ幽伽θ9脚’η・〃θ∬ε9㍑’㎎0
’脚〃頓’∫5∫o邸θ伽m，　nequii’㎜ηoηθ∬θcρ脚肥．
For　God　is　that　than　which　a　g跡eater　camot　be　thought．　Whoever　reany
mdersセmds面s　undq醜mds　cle班ly　that　this　same　being　so　exisね血at　not
even　in　thought　can　it　not　exist．　Thus　whoever　understandS　that　God　exists
in　such　a　way　cannot　think　of　Him　as　not　eXis血g．18
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　　Schufreider　brilliantly　summarizes　schematically　some　of　the　major
contents　of　Anselm，s　Proslogion　II，　III，　and　rV　when　he　says：
This　critical　passage　encompasses　the　entirety　of　Anselm’s　argument．　It
begins　recalling　the　first　step　in　the　reason血g　ofA「osl（）g如η1［：GOd　is　id　quo
maius　cogitari’non　potest．　Now，　whoever脚砂understands　this，　that　is，
that　God　is　something　than　which　nothing　greater　can　be　thought，　well
understandS　that　id　i　sum　sic　esse　ut　nec　cogt°tatione　queat　nonθ∬θ；血t　it
itself　so　exis的山at　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist．　This　latter　claim　is　the
conclusion　which　we　have　detm血Od　is　supposed　tO　f（）llow　fU）m　the　single
argument　of　II　and皿This　clearly　in（五cates　that　the　a【rswer　Anselm　is
of㎞9（to　the　Foolls　l，non　est　das，t　of　Il）does　not　apPeal　to　the　conclusion
of　H，　but　to　a　oonchlsion　which　is　only　stated　in皿【and　can　be　shown　to
follow　not　from　the　reasoning　of　M　alone，　but　fbm　the　single　a【gUment
which　spans皿and　m．　But　something　else　is　notewonhy　here．（IAA．　80）
　　By”here”Schu丘eider　emphatically　points　to　the　importance　peculiar　to
the　above　passage　in　IV．　It　consists　of　three　elements：（1）the　Name　of　God
as　it　is　intuitively　envisioned；（2）the　bene　intelligere（rightful
u血derstanding）；and（3）the　Proof　of　the　Existence　of　God．　Schufreider
speaks　of　each　of　these　after　he　has　articulated　that　in　that　the　repeated　use　of
”intelligit”　refers　us　to　the　strict　manner　of　thinking　in　which　the　very　thing
itself　is　grasped，　our　reading　of　the”id　ipsum”should　be　enlightened：
namely，　we　should　see　that　that　which　the　thing　itself　is（in　this　case，　id　quod
deus　est）involves　within　itself　what　I　might　call　a　distinctively　singular
intentionality　of　being（as　characterized　by　the”sic　esse”）・
　　This　is　what　1　have　obtained　by　reading　betWeen　the　lines　of　Schufreider’s
text　here．　ActUally，　he　writes：”．．．we　should　be　treating　the’id　ipsum　sic
esse，　to　be　claiming　that：it（the　thing）itself　so　exists　that　it　cannot　be
thought　not　to　exist”（IAA，80）．　And　this　last　dictum　of　Schu丘eider，s　is
profbundly　reminiscent　of　Hartshome曾s　reference　to　hayathology　which　he
depicts　in　these　terms　i9：
For　instance，　the　text　translated”I　am　that　I　amtt　is　made　to　support　the
primacy　of　being　and　thus　classical　metaphysics，　although，　as　scholars　te11
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us，　the　verb　j血the　Hehrew　origi　laI　may　be　translated血qUite　other　ways，　as
mear血9”l　hve（or　breathe）as　l　hve，1　act　as　1　ac“　become　what　1　bec　ome，
etC．”My　good　ftiend　Professor　TetSutaro　Ariga　of　KyotO　University　has
witt皿y　suggested　that㎞ead　of　on衣）logy，　what　theologians　need　tO　cUltivate
is勿励hologソor　hayathontologソ，　ut血zing　the　Hebrew　verb　in　question．20
　　At　any　rate，　Schu丘eider　thinks　the　af（）rementioned　consideration　would
clεrifンour　reading　of　t血e　entire　passage　in　questio11．　The　passage　is　of　a
triadic　character，　as　I　mentioned　above．　First，　it　begins，　according　to
Schufreider，　by　claiming　that　God　is　something　than　which　nothing　greater
can　be　thou帥t，　and　i㎜ediately㎞s　to血e　issue　of　what　it　is　really　to
understand　this　id　guo〃2αゴus　cogitariηoη、potest；that　is，　in　that　to
understand　signifies：to　grasp　the　thhlg　itself（by　means　of　reasongs　intuitive
vision）．　Second，　Schu丘eider　perceives　in　the　second　line　that　when　this
something　than　which　a　greater　cannot　be　thought　is　so　understood，　it　is
clearly　seen　that　it（the　thh19）itself　so　exists　that　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to
exist．　Third　and　finally，　it　is　important　to　note，　with　Schufreider，　that
whoever　has　such　sure　insight　into　the　matter　itself　cannot　thhik　that　it　does
not　exist（see　IAA，80）．
　　If　we　c｛m　say　dlat血e　first　stage　of　Anselm°s　ar…um，　ent　for　the　Existence　of
God，　the　Name　of　God　as　intUitively　envisioned　as　id　quo　maius　cogt’tari　non
potest，　is　Reality　in　itself，　then　we　might　be　able　to　say　after　the　manner’　of
Ernst　Fuchs’s　hermeneutics　that　the　second　stage，　theゐene　inte〃ゴgere　or　a
rightfUI　understanding　of　or　an　insight　into　the　sic　esse（namely，　the　self」
inte】「pretative　principle　of　Reality　to　the　effect　that　the　thing　itself　”so　exists”
that　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist），　helps　Reality　to　its　Truth，　the　third
stage　which　is血e　actual血lfillment　of　the　Proof　of　the　Existence　of　God．211
have　just　now　noticed　that　the　bene　inte〃gere　as　an　insight　into　the　sic　esse
is　the　selfLinterpretative　principle　of　Reality　helping　it　to　its　Truth，　the　Proof
　　This　is　impo1伽t　in　that　I　see　the　p血ciple　of　intelpretation　as　inherent　in
and　as　accordillgly　derivative　f『om　the　vision　of　Reality　in　the　case　of
Anselm，s　argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God．　For　if　the　principle　of
interpretation　was　different丘om　the　vision　of　Reality　in　one曾s　scheme　of
thought，　one　would　have　to　find　its　rationale　apart　fヒom　the　vision　of　Reality；
then　one，s血ll　integrity　of　thought　would　be　somewhat　tmncated，　at　least
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metaphysically，　like　Luther’s　doctrille　of　j　ustification，　mentioned　earlier・
That　is　not　the　case　with　Anselm．　Thus，1　concur　wnh　Schufreider　when　he
states：
But　reason°s　insight血to　the　matter　is　unique血廿1is　case，　fbr　the　essential
intUition　of　God　as　that　which　so　exists　that　it　carmot　be　thought　not　to　exist
does　not　disclose　a”universal　essence璽’but　rather　dis血guishes　God　fu）m　all
else，　and　in　so　doing　directs　reason　’s　vtSion　to　the〃latter　in　its　distinct
singUlari’狽凵D（IAA，81；emphasis　Schufヤeider’s）
　　In　other　words，　here　we　obtain　reason’s　vision（namely，　what　we　referred
to　as　the　principle　of　interpretation）and　the　matter　in　its　distinct　singularity
（namely，　Reality　in　itself　or，　if　you　like，　Luther，s　deus　nudus）together　in
皿ity．　What　then　is　t　le　inner　reason　for　this　unity　of　reason，s　vision　and　God
as　such？Ican　find　a　proper　allswer　to　this　question　in　the　fbllowing　passage
of　Schu丘eider，s：
Such闘visionll，　of　course，　does　not　refer　to　the　corPoreal　intUtion　of　hnages
by　the血tagination；that　is，　it　does　not　refer　to”imaginative　Vision，”but　to
the　radically　purified　Vision　of　the　oculi4s　mentis　which　ga血ed　insight　into　itS
matter，　in血is　case，　by　means　of　the　thought血l　disthlction　between　what　so
exists　that　it　camot　be血ought　not　to　exist　and　what　so　exists　that　it　can　be
thought　not　to　exist；the　（lifference　betWeen　GOd　and　everything　else．（LAA，
81；emphasis　Schufbeidefs）
　　In　accordallce　with　this　difference　in　the　matter　of　envisiollillg　between
the　radically　purified　vision　of　God　and　the　imaginative　vision　of　everything
else　we　have　to　account　for　the　difference　in　the　matter　of　ontology，　which
manifests　itself　in　the　actual　procedure　of　the　argument　for　the　Existence　of
God　by　Anselm，　betWeen　the　claim　that　God　so　exists　that　He　cannot　be
thought　not　to　exist　and　the　claim　that　something　exists　both　in　the
understanding　and　in　reality．　For　these　two嚇）es　of　difference　betWeen　God
and　creatures，　one　with　respect　to”vision”and　the　other　with　respect　to
”existehce，1°are　one　in　terms　of　what　Schuf『eider　calls’曾both　reason，s
revelatioll　of　God　and　a　contemplative書s　prescription　fbr　thinking　God（and
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these　be豆ong　together）曾曾with　the”so　exists　that　it　camot　be　thought　not　to
exist璽l　effectively　operative　as　the　distinctive　mark　（proprium）of　God（IAA，
82）．It　is　precisely　in　view　of　this　state　of　affairs　that　Schufreider　tried　to　re－
implant　the　argument　llin　its　native　soil”；that　is，　to　recommend　that
”Anselmls　argument　has　its　roots，　and　therefore　its　life，　in　the　practice　of
contemplatio11”（LへA，82）．
　　Now，　it　seems　to　me　that　the　contemplative　dimension　in　Anselm，s
argument　was　rather　minimized　in　Barth聯s　explication　of　it，　collcomitant　with
his　Protestant　confbssionalism　that　can　be　traced　back　to　Luther曾s　doctrine　of
justificatio11，　as　we　have　demonstrated　earlier；whereas　the　developmental
dimension　in　Anselmls　argument　was　articulately　presented　to　the　fbre　by
Barth．　By　contrast，　Schufreider　appropriately　takes　into　account　both
dimensions　on　an　equal　basis．　However，　when　it　comes　to　discussing　the
problem　of　contemplation，　his　concern　with　Anselm’s　famous　wording，　to
the　effect：”sub　persona　conantis　erigere〃2ente〃z　sua〃1　ad　contemplandu〃1
deum，22　ill　the　person　of　one　striving　to　elevate　his（own）mind’to
contemplate　God，”is　tending　to　be　negativistic，　in　the　sense　of　the
”withdrawal丘om　the　world”characteristic　of　monasticism．　Is　he　doing　fUll
justice　to　the　rich　potelltial　dynamics　of　Anselm’s　argumellt　in　its　depths？I
doubt　it．　This　is　the　reason　why　I　now　opt　for　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　argument　fbr
reason　and　intUition　in　Buddhist　philosophy　in　order　to　fi11　a　gap　here．
II．　D．　T．　Suzuki，s　Argument　fbr　Reason　and　Intuition　in　Buddhist
Philosophy　and　lts　Relevance　to　Anselm’s　Proslogion　II　and　IV
l．　玩ヴnana　a〃d　PraP物aγ5．　Understanding’ηIts　Meak　and　Stアong＆7nses’
Reflections　on　an　Existe〃tial　Leap　or　an　Elevaガon｛）fthe　Mind　toward　God
　　D．T．　Suzuki　begins　his　famous　essay　on”Reason　and　Intuition　in
Buddhist　Philosophy，，　with　these　words：”Foゼintuition，　Buddhists　generally
use！ρral’na曾and　fbr　reason　or　discursive　understanding，　v｛ノnana．　Vi　’nana
and　praj’na　are　always　contrasted．”23　According　to　Suzuki，　prOjna　is　the
負mdamental　noetic　principle　whereby　a　synthetic　apprehension　of　the　whole
becomes　possible，　while吻nana　being　the　principle　of　differentiation（SZ，
124）．Central　to　these　two　notions　is　the　understanding　Suzuki　discloses：
”Vi　’nana　cannot　work　without　having　pra1’na　behind　it；parts　are　parts　of　the
whole；parts　never　exist　by　themselves，　fbr　if　they　did　they　would　not　be
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parts－they　would　evell　cease　to　exist”（SZ，85）．
　　What　I　dlink　is　conspicuous　in　the　above　consideration　by　Suzuki　is　that
there　are　some　interesting　equivalents　here　in　relation　to　Anselmls　ways　of
thinking，　one　in　the　weak　sense　and　the　other　in　the血ll　sense，　appearing
throughout　his　argument　for　the　Existence　of　God　in　Proslogion．011e　of　the
most　important　equivalents　between　them，　let　me　emphasize，　is　that　they　are
both　concemed　with”an　existential　leap”（SZ，121）or”an　elevation　of　the
mind　toward　Godll　which　constitutes　the　development　of
understanding（IAA，84－85）．　For　instance，　Suzuki　writes：
From　vi　’nana　tO　prajna　is　not　a　coninuous　process　or　prog【ess．　If　it　were，
μ吻αwould　ce説め1£p吻澱；it　woUld　become　ano血er飴㎜of疹’nana．
There　is　a　g司p　betWeen　the　two；no　transidon　is　possible；hence　there　is　a
leap，”an　existential　leapll．　Fmm吻吻ηα一thi1」dng　to　p吻吻一seeing　there　is
no　mediaing　concepち　no　room　f（）r　intellectio鶏　no　t㎞e　for　deliberation．　So，
血eBud曲ist　master肛ges　us　to”speak　quick，　quick！”Immediacy，　no
interpretation，　no　explanatory　apology－this　is　what　constitUtes　prqノηα一
intu直tion．（SZ，121）
　　It　seems　to　me　that　it　is　because　of　this　need　fbr”an　existential　leap”that
Suzuki　is　motivated　to　speak　of　the　mondo（question　alld　answer）．　hl　this
sense，　the　mondo　is　that　which　adds　something　cnlcial　to　the　Buddhist
meditation　or　contemplation－something　which　might　also　be　crucial　to
Anselm，s　contemplation．　In　the　previous　section　I　have　mentioned　that
Anselm，s　contemplation，　as　interpreted　by　Schu丘eider，　is　negativistically
characterized　in　terms　of　the”withdrawal　from　the　world．”This　character
might　be　challenged　by　the　Buddhist〃iondo　toward　an　absolutely
affirmative　orientation　toward　the　world．　Let　me　quote　below　in　dlis　regard
some　repre．sentative　cases　of　the　mondo　from　Suzuki’s　volume：
［1］Amo1ik　asked　Zernbi　of　Shurei　monast｛野：”I　mde指伽d楓all血e
rivers，　however　di㎞t　the廿soulces，　pOur　intO　the　great　ocean．　How　many
drops　of　water　coUld　there　be　in　the　ocean？”
The　master　asked：”Have　you　ever　been　tO　the　ocean？曾，
Monk：What　then，　after　we　have　been　tr）the㏄ean？”
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The　master　replied：”You◎ome　tomorrow　and　1　wil1　te11　you．”（SZ，115）
　　In　this　mondo　one　is　encouraged　to　see　after　having　been　to　the　ocean　of
5城ソata　or　emptiness，　in　which，　as　Suzuki　explicates，’lall　the　phenomenal
world　is　absorbed，　and　the　counting　of　drops　of　water　in　it　is　to　understand
what　becomes　of　the　multiplicity　absorbed　therein”（SZ，　l　l　5）．　Although　the
monk　wants　to　find　out　what　the　master　will　say　conceming　the　relationship
between　the　one　and　the　many，　between．prq／na　and　v〃’nana，　the　master
retorts：，℃ome　tomorrow．，，　By　so　saying　he　shows　that　what　is　really　cruciaI
here　is　arriving　at　tomorrow，s　world　without　indulging　in　epistemological
methodology；therefbre，　Suzuki　says　that　”1　do　not　know”　sums　up　the
essence　ofpraj’na－intUition”（SZ，115）．
［2］Seishu　of　R圃i　monastery：
He　once　asked　a　monk：”Do　you　unde1s伽d電he　Buddha－dhamla（the　tUth
or　Ultimate　reality）？”
The　monk　said：’No，　I　do　not，　master．”
”You　hollestly　do　not？’，
”That　is　righg　master．”
”You　leave　me　now　and　come　tomormw．”
The　monk　bowed　sa⊃面g：”Fare　thee　well．”
The　master　1血en　said：INo，　that　is　not　the　pD血．，曹（SZ，　l　l　6－lI7）
　　Here　again　the　master’s　dictUm　”You　leave　me　now　and　come　tomorrow”
appears；but　it　was　taken　by　the　monk　in　its　literal　or　intellectual　sense．　To
remind　him　of　his　misunderstanding　the　master　sofi－heartedly　states：”That　is
not　the　point．旧’The　point，”according　to　Suzuki，”is　to　mderstand　what　is
not　understandable，　to　know　what　is　unlmowable，　wherehlρ吻ηα一intuition
really　consists”（SZ，116）．　First，　you　have　to　leave　the　world　of
conceptuality；and　then，　tomorrow，　you　encounter　the　real　world　in　which
the　unknowable　is　immediately　at　hand－although　appearing　in　manifold
forrns．　Herein　is　involved　what　1　might　call　a　tWofold　significative血nction，
remotive　and　constitutive，　of　the　mondo．
［3］　A　monk　asked　Yomyo：”I　have　been　With　you　f（｝r　a　long　time，　and　yet　I
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am　unable　tO　understand　your　way．　How　is　this？”
The　master　said：”Where　you　do　not　understan（L　there　is　the　poi血t　for　y（）ur
understandmg．Vl
’，gow　is　any　understandmg　pOssible　where　it　is　impossible？璽’
The　master　said：，，The　cow　give　birth　tO　a　baby　elephant；clouds　of　dust　rise
over　lhe　Ocean．，，（SZ，116）
［4j　When　Seishu　was　still　in　his　novitiate　stage　under　Joye，　the　latter，
POi血ti血g　at　the職mmarked：，，Every　drQP　of　it眺your　eyes．鱒
SeiShu　at　the　t㎞e　failed　tO　understand　this，　but　afterwards，　while　stUdying
the　AvatainsakO　Sutra，止e・mean血9（lawn｛虹on㎞．　Later，㎞one　of　his
discourses，　he　said：”All　the　Buddhas　in　the　ten　quarters　of　the　world　are　ever
伽血gyou．　Do　you託舳㎝？If　you　say　you　s㏄，　do　you　s㏄止㎝舳血e
mind　or　with　the　eyes？1°
llJust　becaしse　you　fat皿to　grasp止is　point　and　go　on　chenshng　your　confUsed
Views　in　manifold　ways，　you　errone（）usly　see　differences　and　unities　where
there　are　really　no　dif㎞ces　and　no　unities．
”Just　at血is　ve【y　mome導your㎞mediate　apprehensioll　of　the　mind［i．e．，　the
un㎞owable】is　imperative，　and　then　you　Will　realiZe　that　it　is　vast　eMpt　hless
and　tliere　is　not血hlg　to　see，　no曲g　to　hear．＿”（SZ，116－117）
　　We　know　from　reading　another　of　D．　T．　Suzukils　volumes，　Zen　and
Japanese　Culture，　that　the　milld　and　the　eyes　can　go　hand　in　hand，　with
Basho’s　famous”old　pond”haiku　showing　this　magnificent　truth　as　its
example：
Furu　ike　ya！
Kawazu　tObikomu，
MiZu　no　oto
The　old　pon（乳ah！
A丘て）gjumps　in：
The　watefs　sound！
Suzuki　grasps　Basho’s　old　pond　as　lying　on　the　other　side　of　etemity，
17
where　timeless　time　is．　And　he　goes　on　to　write：
It　is　so”old，”indeed，　that　there　is　nothhlg　more　ancient．　No　scale　of
COnSCiOUSneSS　Can　meaSure　it．　It　iS　WhenCe　a皿thingS　COme，　it　iS廿1e　SOUrCe
of曲world　of　par鉦culas，　yet　in　itself　it　shows　no　p舗cula曲don．　We
come　to　it　when　we　go　beyond　the”rainfall”alld，，the　moss　growing
greener．”But　when　this　is　intellec血1ally　conceived　it　becomes　an　idea　and
beg血s　to　have　an　object　of血tellection．24
　　How　can　we　get　rid　of　the　danger　of　intellection　in　accoumting　for　the　”old
pond”？SuzUki　replies：
It　is　by．　intUition　alone　that　this　timelessness　ofthe　Unconscious　is　truly　taken
hold　of　And　this　i　lmitive　graSp　of　Reality　never　takes　place　when　a　world
of　E噸n㎝is　ass㎜司ou偲ide　o肛ev｛戚y　wodd　of血e㎜es；for止ese
two　worlds，　sensual　and　supersensual，　are　not　separate　but　one．　Therefore，
the　poet　sees　i　ltO　the　Unconscious　not　through　the　stillness　of　the　old　pond
b皿血ou帥血e　somd血red　up　by血e　jumping　frog．　Wi血out血e・sound
there　is　no　seeing　on　the　part　of　Basho　intO重he　Unconscious，　hl　which　lies
the　source　of　creativities　and　upon　which　all　true　artists　draw　fbr　their
血司piration．（Z∫C，241－242）
　　With　respect　to　the　third　line，　llM伽no　oto”；”The　water，s　sound！，”it
might　fairly　be　said　that　without　the　fセog　the　old　pond　can血ot　make　a　sound，
and　vice　versa．　hl　other　words，　what　lies　at　the　core　of　Basho’s　intuition　is
an　insight　into　the　unity　of　the　pond　or　the　Trans－Individual　or　the　Mind　and
the　frog　or　the　individual　or　the　eye－the　ullity　which　constitutes　the　entirety
of　our　daily　experiences．　This　u血derstanding　of　the　unity　in　question　is　in
line　with　SuzUki’s　view　of　emptiness　which　he　expresses　in　these　terms：
，，auddhist　philosophy　has　sat　for’being曾，　asat　fbr”non－being「曾，　and　sunγata
fbr’emptiness，，　showing　that’emptiness，　has　a　positive　connotation　and　is　not
amere　negation．　Sunyata　trallscends　being　and　non－being；that　is，　both
presuppose　the　idea　of　sunyata．　Therefbre，　when　a　Buddhist　philosopher
declares　that　there　is　nothing　to　see，　nothing　to　hear，　etc．，　we　must
understand　it　as　not　denying　the　experiences　of　our　daily　life　but　as　indeed
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confirming　them　in　every　way”（SZ，117）．
［5］Ke茸yu　of　Hamya　monastery　came　to　the”Dhamla－Hall”and　the　monks
congregated　hea血g　the　boa］rd　stuck　three　times，　which　was　the　signal　fbr
them　tO　come　tOgether．　The　mas愉血㎝recit｛対an　hnpmm卿v鯉：
’tStrange血deed－｛he　board　thrice　struck
And　you　monks　are　al1　gathered　here．
As　you　already　know　we皿how　tO　tel1　the　t㎞e，
Ineed　not　rePeat　it　over　again．曾曾
He　left血e　hall　without　sayh真g　any血ing血mher．（SZ，　l　l　7）
　　It　is　important　to　make　a　distinction　between　all　kinds　of　acts　of　religious
piety，　illcludillg　the　one　mentioned　above，　the　master曾s　sermon，　and　the
actual　gathe血g　of　the　monks　in　response　to　the　sound　of　the　board　stmck
three　times．　I　would　like　therefbre　to　collcur　with　Suzuld　when　he　states：
”We　may　not　all　claim　to　be　Buddhists；we　may　even　protest　against　being
called　religious；but　the　deeds　here　mentioned　are　what　we　are　pe㎡fo㎜ing
every　day．　It　does　not　make　any　difference　whether　we　are　Buddhists　or
Christians　or　communists”（SZ，117）．
　　Now，　referring　back　to　Anselm璽s　argument　from　the　perspective　of
Bud曲is惚o痂S舳espouses，　it　tms　out　that　”an　immediate　existential
leap”essential　to　the〃zondo　is　very　much　in　parallel　with”an　elevation　of
the　mind　toward　God”from　understanding（in　the　weak　sense）the　sign
signifying　the　thing　without　in　any　way　understanding（in　the　strong　sense）
the　thing　itsel£As　we　already　know，　there　was　at　tthe　very　starting　point　of
Anselmgs　argument　the　way　in　which　II　characterizes　what　the　Fool
”understands”：namely，　he　llunderstands　what　he　hears”（inte〃igit　quod
audの．　That　is　to　say，　he”understands　the　words　that　he　hears　in　so　far　as　he
speaks　the　language”（IAA，84）．　In　a　word，　the　Fool雪s　understanding　is
merely　a　rhetorical　one．　By　contrast，　this　weaker　sense　of”thinking　or
understandi119”athing　is　rejected　in　IV　as　inadequate　fbr　a　proper
understanding　of　the　matter　at　hand．
　　Thus，　Anselm’s　argument　is　shot　through　with　a　leap丘om　II　toward　IV　in
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the　matter　of　understanding　the　thing　itself（i．e．，　God）；and　I　think　the
twofbld　significative　fUnction，　remotive　and　constitutive，　of　the　Buddhist
mondo　has　something　new　to　contribute　to　Anselmls　leap，　Tnle，　we　can
notice，　with　Schu倉eider，．the　following　crucia豆point：”if　Anselm’s　argument
begins　in　II　by　simply　thin1（ing　in　the　weak　sense　the　sign　signifying　the
thing，　and　ends　in　IV　demanding　that　one　think，　in　the　strong　sense，　that
which　the　thng　itself　is（id　ipsum　quod　res　est　intelligゴtur），　then　this　must
mean　that　the　aim　and　strategy　of　the　argument　involves　the　devel（）pment　of
understanding”（SZ，84；emphasis　Schufreider蜜s，）．　Yet，　Anselm曾s
developmenta1　argument，　as　is　so　viewed　by　Schu丘eider，　is　of　a　negativistic
character，　as　we　mentioned　earlier．
　　What　in　Anselm，s　argument　plays　a　role　similar　to　the　mondo　with　its　two
elements　of　intuition（pra1’nのand　reason（吻’nana）at　work　within　it，　I
assume，　is　the闘so　exists　that　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist”as　the
distinctive　mark（propriu〃1）of　God（cf　SZ，82）．　From　my　comparative
perspective　Schufヒeider，s　f（）llowing　passage　is　of　the　utmost　importance　hl
clarifying（even　unknowing董y，　I　would　say）what　is　needed　fbr　the
completion　of　Anselm’s　argument　at　which　is　operative　both　reasongs
revelation　of　God　and　a　contemplative，s　prescription　fbr　thinking　God（and
these　belong　together）：
Against止e　s血㏄m㎝聯of　w㎞90　e廊お甑it㎜ot　be血oゆno伽
eXist　all　other　beings　pale，　as　iftO　nothing．　And　the　contemplative，s　task　is　tO
pelZtrorm　this　annulment　of　existing　creatures　so　that　they　may　fade　from
reason，s　sight．　For　it　is　through　ttiis　Withdrawal　of　all　creatures　that　the　way
is　clealred　fbr　a　radicalCソpunfied（tai血onal）vision　ofthe〃2α惚アitSelf　that　is，
of　some曲g　than　which　nothing　greater　can　be　thought．（SZ，82；emPhasis
his）
　　Although　Schufreider　is　convinced　of　the　way　in　which　the　withdrawa1　of
all　creatures　gives　rise　to　a　radically　purified　vision　of”something　than
which　nothillg　greater　can　be　thought，璽’it　seems　to　me　that　he　has　not
mentiolled　what　might　be　inversely　correlative　to　the　annulment　of　existing
creatures　by　the　contemplatives．　If　so，　he　has　not　elucidated　the　power　of
contemplation　by　virtue　of　which　we　contemplatives　can　truly　perform　the
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amulment　of　existing　creatures　in　question．　It　is　precisely　in　view　of　this
need　fbr　elucidating　the　power　of　contemplation　that　I　look　upon　Suzuki，s
discussion　of　the　mondo　as　highly　edifying　because　of　its　reference　to　the
dynamic　nature　of　sunアata　or　emptiness．　Suzuki　writes：
When　we　speak　of　the　prOjna－continuum　as　undifferentiated　or
differentiated　we　must　not　think　that　this　process　of　differentiation　is　a
fUnction　9iven　tO　the　co血uum　from　an　outSide　source．　The　differentiation
is　evolved丘て）m　wi血in　the　con血uum，　f（｝r　it　is　not　the　nature　of　the　pral’ua－
continuum　to　remain　in　a　state　of　sunyata，　absolutely　motionless．　It
dernandS　of　itself　that　it　differentiate　itself　u血itedly，　md舳e㎜e㎞e
it　deshes　to　rema血itself　ba1°hα　is　always　trying　to　preserve　itS　self－identity
and　yet　subjectS　itself　tO血丘nite　divelsification．　That　is　why　sunyata　is　said
to　be　a　reservoir　of　infinite　possibilities　and　not　just　a　state　of　mere
emptiness．　Differentia血g　itSelf　and　yet　remaining　in　itSelf　undifferentiated，
and　thus　tO　go　on　etumally　engaged　in　the　work　of　creatio卜this　is　sunyata，
血ep吻㈱n血u㎜．（SZ，123）
　　This　elucidation　of　the　dynamic，　contemplative－cum－creational，　nature　of
sunyata　is　highly　edifンing　fbr　the　sake　of　the　further　development　of
Anselmls　argumellt　because　it　legitimately　accounts　fbr　the　meanillg　of
”nihil　maius”（Nothing　Greater）in　the　Name　of　God　as　llsomething　than
which　Nothing　Greater　can　be　conceivedll（aliquid　quo　nihil　maitLs　cogitari
po∬の．
　　Now，　it　has　been　clarified　again　that　God　is　loyal　to　Nothingness　Greater，
which　is　the　first　thesis　of　my　theology　of　loyalty　mentioned　at　the　outset　of
this　essay．　If　that　is　tnlly　the　case　with　the　Deity，　he　is　entitled　to　fbfbid　us
to　conceive　a　greater，　thus　leading　us　into　perfbmling　the　annulment　of
existing　creatures　in　question，　which　corresponds　to　the　third　thesis　of　my
theology　of　loyalty，　the　evocative　principle　in　the　universe　as　God．
㎞asmuch　as　God　humbles　himself　to　be　loyal　to　Nothingness　Greater，　we
are　tmly　encouraged　to　perfbml　the　annulment　of　creatures，　including
ourselves．　Herein　lies，　I　might　say，　the　p血ciple　of”inverse　correlation”25
between　God　and　creatures．111　Lutheran　conceptuality　I　can　express　it　as　the
correspondence　of　the　Divine”sese、profundum　humiliare”　26　and　our
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creaturely　humilitas　in　the　spirit　of　”Libenter　peccator　ut　tu　iusn：ficeris　in
me．鱒27
　　1ncidentally，　the　selfLemptying　Emptiness　is　the　third　thesis　of　my
theology　of　loyalty，　which　has　been　brilliantly　elucidated　and　articulated　by
Suzuki，　as　we　saw．　Emptiness　negates　itself　as　a　concept　remotively
（renovendo）in　order　to　establish　itself　anew　in　actuality　constitutively
（constituendo）．　Hence，　Suzuki　puts　fbrward　his　logic　ofpr｛ノ〃α一intuition　in
this　manner：”A　is　not－A　and　therefbre　A　is　A”（SZ，120）．
　　This　same　state　of　affairs　Suzuki　expresses　in　reference　to　the
contemplation／creation　dynamics　peculiar　to　emptiness：’℃reation　is
contemplation　and　contemplation　is　creation．　When　sunyata　remains　in
itself　alld　with　itself，　it　is　contemplation；when　it　subjects　itself　to
differentiation　it　creates．　As　this　act　of　differentiation　is　not　something
imposed　upon　it　but　an　act　of　self」generation，　it　is　creation；we　can　say　it　is　a
creation　out　of　not血hlg，’（SZ，123）．
　　What　matters　in　theology，　on　the　one　hand，　serves　this　dynamics　of
Emptiness　emptying　itself　hl　the　spirit　of　loyaIty，　thereby，　however，　on　the
other，　paradoxically　giving　rise　to　itS　own　creativity．　Hence，　the　dynamics
of　contemplation／creation　pOculiar　to　emptiness　necessarily　accompanies
theology，　even　Anse豆m°s　argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God．　Accordingly，　it
is　through　the　withdrawal　of　all　creatures　turning　into　their　utter　re－
affimation　which　is　tomorrow’s　business，281might　say，　that　the　way　is
cleared　fbr　a　radically　re－pun：fied　Buddhist一αアistian（rational）vision　of　the
matter　itself，　that　is，　of　something　than　which　Nothing　Greater　can　be
conceived．
　　”This　vision　over－passes，”claims　Schuf士eider，”all　those　things　which　can
be　thought　not　to　exist［let　me　add，　though：if　lefしalone］until　it　comes　to　rest
upon　that　which　alone　tnlly　exists［with　us］，　in　its　singularity　and　precisely
as　that　which　sic　e∬e　ut　nec　cogitatione　queat　non　e∬e　lcum　nobis711（SZ，
82）．The　net　result　of　the　proof　of　the　Existence　of　God　is　the　proof　of　God，s
being，lwithll　us．　This　is　because　the　inverse　correspondence　between　God
and　creatures，　mentioned　above，　tums　out　to　be　enabled　only　by　vhtue　of
Nothingness　Greater［nihil　maius］：namely，　this　is　the　state　of　affairs　that　we
can　express，　wi血St．　Paul，　in　these　terms：”Nothing　shall　be　able　to　separate
us丘om　the　love　of　God　which　is　in　Christ　Jesus　our　Lord”（Rom．8：39）．
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Within　this　context，　it　appears　that　the　intentionality　of　being　inherent　in　the
sic　esse（llso　exists　that　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist”）is　inclusive　not
only　of　the　Deity　but　also，　in　one　and　the　same　breath　inseparably，　of　us
creatures”with”Him－and　this　in　a　wondrous　gracious　mamer．
2．Gratias　tibi，　bone　Domine：Toward　a　Buddhist－Christian　Gratitude　with
Barth・’s　Exposition　as　Guide
　　The　Proof　as　Anselm　wanted　to　conduct　it　and　had　to　conduct　it　finishes
in　this　mamer：
GratiαS　tibi，　bone　Domine，　gratiαs　tibi，　guia　quodprius　credidi彪donan彪，
iam・sic・inte〃’90彪’〃痂ηα鵬伽∫彪esse　nolim　credere，　non　Pα∬im・non
厩〃igere．σ104，5fO
Ithank　thee，　goOd　Lor¢　1　thank　thee，　that　what　1　at　first　believed　because　of
thy　gift　1　now　know　because　of　thine　illumining　in　such　a　way　that　even　if　I
did　not　want　to　believe　thine　Existerice，　yet　I　coUld　not　but　know　it．（AFQI，
170）
　　Now，　herein　is　manifest　what　Anselm　understands　by　proof．1　think　Karl
Barth’s　explication　of　the　inner　relationship　between　the　accomplished　Proof
of　the　Existellce　of　God　by　Anselm　and　his　gratitude　is　excellellt　ill　that　it
clarifies　what　theology　is　all　about　at　its　core．　Barth　begins　his　reflection　on
this　issue　with　these　words：
Not　a　science　that　can　be　unraveled　by　the　Church’s　faith　and　that　establishes
1血eChu【ch’s　fai1血i皿as（）urce　outSide　of　itSelf．　It　is　a　question　of　1血oology．　It
is　a　question　of　the　proof　of　fanh　by　faith　which　was　already　established　in
itSelf　Without　proof．　And　both－－faith　that　is　proved　and　faith　that　proves－－
Anselm　expressly　lmderstands　not　as　pres叩pOsitions　tl）at　can　be　achieved
by　man　but　as　presupPositions　that　have　been　achieved　by（iOd，　the　former
as　divile　donai昭and　the　latter　as　div血e∫〃tZminare．（AFQI，170）
　　As　mentioned　earlier，　there　are　two　types　of　metaphysics：one　is
concerned　with　the　integral　relationship　of　the　vision　of　Reality　with　its　self一
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interpretative　principle；and　the　other　consists　in　making　a　distinction
between　the　vision　of　Reality　and　its　interpretative　principle．　Obviously，　as
is　clearly　shown　by　Barth，　Anselm’s　case　represents　the　fbrmer　type　of
metaphysics，　whereas　the　latter　type　of　metaphysics　is　vigorously　pursued　by
Luther　in　his　doctrine　of　justificatioll　whereby　the　justice　by　which　God
makes　us　righteous（iustitia　qua　nos　iustas　faciens）is　differentiated　from　the
justice　of　God　as　such　by　which　God　as　he　is　in　himself　is　righteous．
　　In　this　latter　case，　one　cannot　find　the　basis　fbr　the　principle　of
interpretation　in　the　vision　of　Reality　in　itself；and　this　is　the　reason　why　the
Protestant　revealed　theology　of　the　Lutheran　type　is　amiss　with　metaphysics，
thereby　presenting　itself　as　a　truncated’metaphysics．　By　contrast，　in　the
fbmler　case，　one　can　interpret　the　vision　of　Reality　by　vi血e　of　the　same
vision　of　Reality，　For　instance，　what　Ba曲丘nds　in　Anselm’s　proof　of　faith
is　a　self：interpretative　case（or　what　Barth　calls”faith　that　proves”）of　the
metaphysics　of　faith，　or　of　the　vision　of　Reality　as　aliguid　guo〃ihil〃zaius
cogitari　po∬it．（which　constitutes　what　Barth　refers　to　as”　faith　that　is
proved四）．
　　Accordingly，　as　presuppositions　that　have　been　achieved　by　God　Anselm
accounts　fbr　the　vision　of　Reality　in　itself　and　its　selfLinterpretative　principle
in　terms　of　divine　donare　and　divine　illu〃linare．　What　has　already　been
given　as血e　Name　of　God　is　now　illumined　by　means　of　the　Proof　of　the
Existence　of　God．　But　there　necessarily　occurs　in　between　these　two
occasions－一一一divine　donare　and　divine’〃umゴnare－一一一a　tertiary　occasion　in
Anselmls血nd，　the　bene　intelligere（rightfU1　understanding）which　is　shot
through　with　what　Barth　desigllates　as”thinldng　to　God，l　or　prayer　inasmuch
as　Anselm　speaks　about　God　while　speaking　to　him，　saying，　Da　mihi，
ut＿intelligam　quia　es，　sicut　credimus（Prosl．2：IlOl，3f）：”Grant　me．．．that
I　may　know　that　thou　dost　exist　as　we　believe”（cf　AFQI，101）．　Thus，　Barth
writes：
He曾assum｛虹’neither　the　Church雪s（］re伽o曲own　credere，　b曲e　prayed
and　the　Church’s　Cre伽nd　his　own　credere　were　assumed．　God　gave
㎞〔nself　tO　hirn　tO　know　and　he　was　able　tO　knoVv　G（岨．　On出is　f（）undation，
comparable　to　no　philosophical　presupposition　and　inconceivable　f（）r　all
systemadc　thθology，　he　has　come　tO　know　and　has　proved　the　EXistence　of
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God．　For血at　reason　his　1ast　word　must　be　gratitude．　Not　satisfaction　over　a
wotk　that　he　has　completed　and　that　resounds　to　his　own　praise　as　its　master，
but　gratitUde　for　a　wotk　that　has　been　done　and　ofwhich　he　is　in　no　sense　the
master．（AFQI，170－171）
　　God，　in　Bar血’s　view，　gave　himself　to　Anselm　to　know　and　he　was　al）le　to
㎞ow　God．　But，　let　me　asK　in　what　mode　of　Existence？My｛mswer：in　the
Divine　mode　of　Existence”with”us．　lnasmuch　as　God　revealed　himself　in
IV，　in　response　to　Anselm，s　prayer　in　reasoning　put　doWn　in　II，　as　that　which
so　exists　that　it　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist，　God　exists”with”　Anselm　as
he　is　prayerfUlly　reasoning．
　　Of　course，　Anselm　strives　to　elevate　his　mind　to　pray　in　reasoning
（namely，　to　contemplate）while　perfbmling　the　annulment　of　existing
creatures　because　he　is　standing　under　the　compulsioll　of　the　Existence　of
God．　However，　in　accordance　with　the　Name　of　God　as　Somethillg　than
which　Nothing　Greater【nihil　maius］can　be　conceived，　I　think　Anselm　is　at
one　and　the　same　time　urged　to　conceive　Emptiness　emptying　itself　as
surpassing　the　Deity　in　such　a　way　as　it　paradoxically　embodies　itself　in
lying　betWeen　the　Deity　and　him．291f　so，　we　need　to　Conceive　God　as　being
loyal　to　Emptiness　lying　between　the　Deity　and　us　creatures－hence，　as
graciously　being　llwith”us　at　the　bottomless　bottom　of　our　existence．　We
also　need　to　conceive　this　same　God　as　calling　fonh　our　faith　or　loyalty　or
obedience　in　us　precisely　by　giving　himself　to　us．　Then，　our　gratitude　tends
to　be　twofbld：first，　for　God，s　fUndamenta1　togetherness　wnh　us　by　vi血e　of
Nothingness　Greater　or　Emptiness　emptying　itself；and　secolld，　fbr　God，s
　　　　　　eVOCatlVe　nearneSS　tO　US．
　　My　idea　of　a　Buddhist－Christian　gratitude　stands　fbr　these　considerations．
In　this　new　ullderstanding　of　gratitude　as　distinct　from　Barth’s，1，
nevertheless，　concur　with　Barth　when　he　states　brilliantly：
GOd　gave　himself　as　the　object　of　his　knowledge　and　G（》d　iU㎜血ed　h㎞that
he　might　know　hirn　as　object．　Apart丘om血s　even仙ene　is　no　p正oof　of　the
existence，　that　is　ofthe　reahty　of（｝od．　But　in　the　power　of　this　event　there　is
a　proofwhich　is　wo血yof蜘de．　Itis血舳athas隅k㎝mdnot㎜
in　search　of　fanh．　Man　might　not　want　faith．　Man　might　remain　always　a
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ibol．　As　we　heard　it　is　of　graoe　if　he　does　not．　But　even　if　he　did，　si　te　e∬e
nolim　credej昭，　truth　has　spoken－in　a　way　that　cannot　be　ignored，　re血ted　or
forgotten　and　in．such　a　way　that　man　is　forbidden　and　tO　that　e漉tis曲le
not　to　recognize　it．　Just　because　it　is　the　science　of飴ith　about　faith，
theology　possesses　Iight　but　it　is　not　the　light　of　the　theologian，s　f…lith．
（AFQI，171）
　　To　me　one　thing　is　clearly　implied　in　this　passage：although　the　Divine
mode　of　Existence　is　necessary　existence，　in　the　sense　that　God　so　exists　that
God　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist，　if　it　is　the　case　that　God，　as　Barth　argues，
gave　himself　as　the　o切ect　of　Anse㎞「s㎞owledge，　thus　illumining　him　that
he　might　know　him　as　object，　God　as　he　is　known　by　Anselm　who　certainly
is　a　contingent　being，　is　definitely　hlclusive　of　contillgent　actuality．　Herein
is　involved　what　I　might　call　the　Divine　self－reversion　of　being丘om
necessary　existence（esse）into　contingent　actuality（existens），　fヒom　which　is
derivative　the　development　of　the　proof　of　the　Existence　of　God　as　this
occurs　in　the　mind　of　Anselm　who　reasons　while　praying　to　Him．　If　so，
what　Hartshorne　refers　critically　to　as　a”real　duality　in　God”in　partial
opposition　to　what　would　seem　to　be　Anselm璽s　negligellce　at　this　point
despite　his　discovery　of　llthe　modal　uniqueness　of　the　idea　of　God”is，　in
actuality，　clearly　visible　in　Anse豆m，　too－contrary　to　Hartshorne璽s
assumption（cf．　AD，134）．　Gladly　to　say，　this　is　our　re－discovery　of
Anselm，s　discovery：Anselm，s　Deity　is　inclusive　not　only　of　necessary
existence　but　also　of　colltingent　existence．　hl　this　respect，　God　for　him　is　the
One　who　truly　exists－”truly”signifying　the　all－hlclusive　mode，　contingent
as　well　as　necessary，　of　the　Divine　existence，　in　which　God　is”with”us．30
　　Now，　it　is　in　this　particular　sense　that　1　can　understand　what　Barth　means
when　he　says　that”si　te　esse　nolim　credere，　truth　has　spoken－in　a　way　that
ca皿ot　be　ignored・”Yet，　I　don°t　think　that　Balth　has　elucidated　the　very
power　by　virtue　of　which　the　Diville　selfLreversion　in　question　can　and　does
actually　take　place．　To　me　it　appears　that　the　Divine　power　of　self」reversion
originates　in　God’s　loyalty　to　Emptiness　emptying　itself　in　such　a　way　that
solely　the　One　who　has　experienced　loyalty　can　and　therefore　does　actually
evoke　loyalty　in　us　creatures．　Then，　I　can　say　after　the　mamer　of　a　Karl
Barth　while　at　the　same　time　putting　fbrward　what　is　genuinely　my　own
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idea：just　because　it　is　the　science　of　loyalty　about　loyalty，　a　Buddhist－
Christian　theology　of　loyal1ッpossesses　light　but　it　is　not　the　light　of　the
theologian，s　loyalty．
●
Conclusions’
　　　Now，　let　me　make　some　concluding　remarks　below：
1．　172e　Paradoxical　Reversal（ゾtheハleed　qヂFaith／bアし1ンiderstanding　to
しrnderstanding｝ヅゴthou’、Fとzith　and　Its　Buddh　ist－Christian　Explication’The
Argu〃ient　FulLfi〃ε4
　　Finally，　we　have　been　led　to　envision　that　the　light　of　the　Divine　loyalty
overflows　human　ba㎡ers！Schufreider　knows　very　well　about　this　miracle
fbr　which　Anselm　gives　thahks　to　God，　saying，（｝ratias　tibi，　bone　Domi〃θ．
Thus，　he　states：
（k）nta血ed血this　passage　is　a　paradoXical　reversal　of　the　often　quoted血1e
wh6h㎞伽ly醐es乃o蜘ηH：”nili　credidero，　non　inte〃igam”；
”unless　1　believe，　I　sha皿not　understand．vl　Here　in　IV　Anselm　proclai血s血at
even　if　he　did　n6t　believe，　he　should　nevertheless　be　unable　not　to
understand．　Presumably，　this　marks　the　binding　character　of　such
tt奄撃撃高高狽奄盾氏C”an皿umination　for　which　one　is　prepared　by　the　reaso血g　of
fi　and　M　and　which　has　shed　so　much　light　on　the　matter　that　Anselm　is
willing　to　claim　that　even　without　faith　the　existence　of　God　would　be
eVidmt．σAA，85）
　　Is　such　il豆umination，　then，　standing　by　itself　or　reflecting　in　itself　its　inner
source　when　it　has　shed　so　much　light　oll　the　matter，　that　which　the　thing
itself　is（id　ipsum　guod　res　est），　that　Anselm　is　willing　to　claim　that　even
without　faith　the　existence　of　God　would　be　evident？Schuffeider　doesnサt
raise　this　question，　and　therefbre　seems　to　be　presupposing　the　binding
ch飢acter　of　such　ill㎜㎞a丘on　without　any　f㎞er　reason．
By　con幡t，　we　contend血at　the　biding　character　of　such　illumination，　as
it　gives　rise　to　the　paradoxical　reversal　of　theη∫3’credidero，　non　in彪11ゴga〃ゴ，
（，，mless　I　believe，　I　shall　not　understand”）to　the鷹〃θε∬e　nolim　credere，
non　po∬im　non　in　telligere”（”if　I　did　not　want　to　believe　that　You　existed，　I
should　nevertheless　be　unable　not　to　understand　it”），　is　re且ecting　in　itself　its
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imer　source，　the　self－reversion　of　the　Deity　as　he　is　loyal　to　Nothingness
Greater［nゴhil　maius］to　the　Deity　as　he　evokes　loyalty　in　us　creatures．　And
負1rther，　this　Divine　self：reversion　presupposes　Emptiness　emptying　itse1£
the　ultimate　metaphysical　principle　of　self－reversion．
　　The　Divine　loyalty　has　these　two　dimensions　of　self」reversion　at　its　core．
As　such，　it　sheds　so　much　li帥t　over且owing　humam　barriers　that　at　the　close
of　III　we　are　told　that　llit　is　evident　to　a　rational　mind”（in。pアomptu　sit
rationali　menのthat　God　truly　exists－”truly，l　signifying，　as　our　final　re－
examination　of　Hartshomels　theory　shows，　the　al1－illclusive　mode　of　the
Divine　existence，　contingent　as　well　as　necessary，　in　which　God　is”with”us．
31And　now　at　the　close　of　rV　Anselm　claims　that　one　who　does　not　believe
should　nevertheless　understand．　In　the　words　of　Schufreider：”The
illumination　of　which　Anselm　speaks　is　reason’s　revelation　of　God　as　He　is
brought　before　the　mind　by　the　purified　vision　of　thinlcing”（LAA，85）．　And　I
propose　to　add：the　purified　vision　of　thinking　contains　within　itself　what　I
call　the　Divine　loyalty　with　two　dimensions　of　selfLreversion　at　its　core：
namely，　the　Divine　self」reversion　and　Emptiness　emptying　itself
2．　Pハ卯゜na－lntuitio〃and　1フ露5　”Tha〆”Reason　and　Intuiガon　in　a　Buddhist－
Christian　Persρect加e　Recognized　with　Suzukt”s　Zen　lnsight　as　Guide
　　Emptiness　emptying　itself　is　grasped　by　D．　T．　SuzUki　as　pr41°na　hltuiting
itself　If　Suzuld曾s　purified　vision，　P吻ηα，　illtuits　itsel£it　in　one　case，　claims
S’Uzuki，　makes　the”rock　nod　even　befbre　the　master　uttered　a　word，”and　hl
another　case　keeps”the　master　very　much　alive　even　after　his　is　cremated
and　his　bones　sound　1ike　copper．”Then，　Suzuki　goes　on　to　state：
＼
”How？”one　may　asK　in血is　second　case．　The　master　wo皿d　say：”Does　not
the　boy－attendant　respOnd　tO　my　call，　saying：寧Yes，　mastef？”One　might　stilI
insist　that　the　bOy　iS　not　the　master．　If　I　were　the　master　1　might　strike　you
down，　saying：曾『No　such　nonsense，　O　you　st叩id　fellow！”But　as　I　am　noちI
wil豆say　instead：1，Your　vision　is　still　b㏄louded　by　v珈αηα．　You　s㏄the
master　on　one　side　and　the　boy　on　the　other，　keeping　them　separate
according　tO　our　so－called　objective　methOd　of　interpreting・　an　experience．
You　do　not　s㏄血㎝h血g血each　other，　and　you制tD卿㏄ive㎞t　de曲
，objectivelゾcomes　tO　the　master　but　has　no　power　over，tbat曾which　makes
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止eboy　respond　to　lhe　mastefs　can．　To　see仕直s’that，　is　praj’na－intUition．’，
（SZ，　ll9）
　　This”that”32　pemleates　all　that　exists　as　the　power　of　Emptiness　emptying
itself，　thus　alive　among　us　as　well　as　betweell　God　and　us，　which　prq1’na－
illtuition　attends　to　even　beyond　the　problem　of　death．　And　it　is　operative，
as　far　as　I　call　see，　throughout”reason’s　revelation　of　God”in　Anselmls
argument　fbr　the　Existence　of　God．　Our　intUition　in　this　matter　started　with
acknowledging　the　Name　of　God　as　involving　in　itself　the　Nothingness
Greater［η読∫1　maius］and　now　ends　up　with　a　Buddhist－Christian
interpretation　of　the　paladoxical　reversal　of　faith　preceding　understanding　to
understanding　evell　without　faith，　thus　manifbsting　the　truth，　which
Schu丘eider　espouses，　that”reason　is　the　way　to　the　vision　of　God”（IAA，
95）l
　　In　the　matter　of　reasonhlg　we　are　urged　to　confbml　to　what　we　intuitively
㎞ow　as　presented　in　our　minds　as　the　Really　Real．　Thus，　the　intuitive
knowledge（the　bene　intelligere，　in　Anselm，s　case）as　it　is　properly
conformed　to　by　reason　helps　the　Really　Real（the　Name　of　God　as　aliquid
quo　nihil〃laius　cogt’如7ちρo∬のto　its　Tm1血（the　all－inclusive　Existence　of
God”with　us”）．331n　my　case，　reason　is　a　Buddhist－Christian　reason　which
has　been　at　work　throughout　this　essay　with　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　Buddhist　insight
into　the　matter　of”reason　and　intuition”as　guide．
3．Reason・As・the〃砂姐舵恥’oηqプGo4αη4伽Rθ1εvα〃ce・to・a・Buddhist－
Chπistian　Perspective’Schufre’der’S　COηか゜’わution／4ckOowledged
　　Specifically　speaking，　I　believe，　in　order　fbr　reason　to　function
appropriately　we　need　some　authentic　urge　or　urges　to　face　us．　In　this
respect，　the　role　of　Zen　mondo　is　in　parallel　with　the　role　of　what　Barth　calls
’，狽??@compulsion　of　knowledge　of　Godls　Existence，”as　has　been
demonstrated　thus飴r　in　comection　wi血dle負mction　of　the　Nothingness
Greater［nihil　maius］in　our　examination　of　Anse㎞，s　argument．　This　grasp
of　the　matter，　admittedly，　is　a　new　one，　as　compared　with　the　famous
discussion　of　the　relation　between　II　and　III；and　it　fbrces，　as　Schufヒeider
acknowledges　concerning　his　own　case　of　interpretation，　the”emergence　of
issues　we　are　not　usually　asked　to　consider　in　connection　with　Anselm，s
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reasonillg”（IAA，95）．　However，　he　thinks　it　is　clear　by　now　that”．．．the
strangeness　presently　confronting　us　does　not　lie　simply　in　my　account，　but
at　the　heart　of　the　reasoning　itself’（IAA，95）．
　　Fur山er，　Schufreider　writes：
It［the　st㎜geness］stems　fr（）m　the　fact　that　Anse㎞，s　arguInent　attemptS　to
unite　logical　rigor　with　mystical　illsight；and　we　are　not㏄customed　to　the
strenuous　demand　upon　th血king　such　a　seeming　unlikely　union　entails．
Tbose　wllo缶eat　the　argulnent　as　an　e】q）resSion　of　mysticism（independent　of
logical　standardS）miss　this　as　surely　as　those　who　deal　with　it　as　an　exercise
㎞logic．　In　Anse㎞止ese　two　d㎞ensions　a曲lended；for，　on　his　accoung
reαson　t斡　the　w4ア如〃ie　vtSion　o，ヂGod．（LAへ95；emphasis　Schufteider’s）34
　　What　he　says　concerning　Anselm’s　argument　is　doubly　tme　in　my　own
Buddhist－Christian　neo－Anselmian　re－interpretation　of　the　argument　which　I
think　is　inter－religiously・amplified　by　Suzuki’s　Zen　insight　into　the　matter　of
”reason　and　intuition．tt
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血Barth’s　theology　gave　rise　to　Japanese　philosopher　Ka重sumi　Takdzawa’S　proposal　ofthe
idea　of”irreversibility”－together　with　the　notions　of”inseparableness”and，lnon－
identifiability”－in　critically　re－examining　his　mentor　Kitaro　Nishida’s　mder部andl皿g　of
”God　alld　the　world．”Takセawa　w撤es：，lIf　Dr．　Nisllida　had副y　bmuεht㎞o　its　pmp訂
oonsequence　his　Odginal　intention　h血erent　in　his　nodons　of’1conthluity㎞discontinu量ty「’
and，1㎞verse㎞tation，”he　might　have　foumd　anew　that　what　lies　beyond　this　world（or
what　Kenji　Miyazawa　refers　tr）as，’the　fourth　dimension，，）and　what　hes　on面s　side，
Jensei給and　DiesseitS，　are　dist血guished　in　tems｛～プ〃le　absoゐ己彪irreversible　ordαr－and
this　Without　doing　damage　to　wllat　is　positively　expressed　by　Nishidals　philosophical
ideas　of　”soku”（sゴve－relationship）and”contradiCtory　self－identity”of　God　and　the　world
as　eppOsed　tO　t【aditional　Christianity，s　behavior　with　a　l，sad　oountenan㏄’，（Matt．6：16）
（Tak加wa　Katsumi　Chosakztshu［Works］，　Vol．1，　Kyoto：Hozokan，1972），　p．432．
Takizawa　critically　assumes　that　Nishida’s　philosophical　insights，　including　those
disclosed　at　the　final　sbeq）s　of　his　caleer血the　last　essay　written　just　bef（）le　his　death　on
July　7，1945：”The　Logic　of　Place　and　a　Religious　Worldview”（now　con面ned　in
ハliShidU　Kitaro　Zenshu［Complete　Wodくs】，　Vo1．11，　Tokyo：IwImami　Shoten，1965），
lacked’the　element　of”廿reversibilitジalthough　sufficiently　clearly　dealing　with　the
elenients　of　”insqparableness”　and曾，non－iden雌abihty．冒，　On　the　other　han¢however，　his
We…mm　mentr）r　K雄l　Ba血according紋）Tak屹aw亀was　not副y　clear　enough　in　his
grasp　of　the　i皿sq㎜bl㎝ess　of　the　relationship　between　God　and止e　world　shlce　he
looked　u卿出e馳m㎝t飢Di血e－human血妙as”mihated”by止e　lncarnation　ofthe
Etemal　Word　of　God　in　the　history　and　person　of　Jesus　as　the　Christ（see，　e，g．，
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伽伽加［WorkS】，　Vol．2：S舳es血㎞l　B｛血】〈yoto：Hozo㎞，1975，　ch．　IX：
，’vas　hindert　mich　noeh　mich　taUfen　zu　1assen？脚，　pp．435・464，卿．　pp．448－449，456－
457）．As　to　my　studies　of　Takizawals　thought，　see　the　fb皿ow血g　essays：’曾P血ciples　fbr
Interpreting　Christ／Buddha：Katsumi　Takizawa　and　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr．，”Buddhist・
Christian　Studies，　Vo1．3，1983，63－97；”．4nalogia．Actionis：ANew　Proposa蓋fbr
Christology，From　Below，，1°Union　5伽∫πα1γS？uar彪rly、Rθり’θw，39／4，1984，268－85；
”KatSumi　TakiZawa：Approach　Toward　A　W（）rld　Theology：AC面cal　Exposi丘on　From
AProcess　Perspective，1’砺わn．Sllmina，　y　s2uarterly　Revi’ew，41／3＆4，1987，39－54．
Karl　Barth，77ie、Epistle如the　Romans，　trans．　Edwyn　C．　Hoskyns（London：Oxfbrd
University　Press，1933），　p．317．
See　D．　T．　Suzuki，コElssays　in　Ztm　Bucldhism，　p．139．
In　th治sentence－｛：specially　by　the　expression　1’thereby　pamdoxica皿y　tend　j皿g　to　be曾l　hl
it≒－1　am　claiifying　my　position　regarding　the　famous　Kantian　question　about　whether
eXistence　coUld　be　derivable丘om　the　meIe　concept　of　a　Being．、　My　pOsition　here　is　in
line　With　Chatles　Hartshorne’s　critique　of　Kanfs　pOsition（presented　in　his（Jritique　of
Ptire　Reason，　trans．　Max　Mueller【New　Yotk　and】k）ndon：The　Macmillan　Compaロy，
1920］，pp．483－86）hl　the　fbllowhlg　dictum：，lIn　these　famous　passages　Kant　seems
sca1℃ely　aware　that　f㎞m　the　standpoi皿t　of　tlle　second　Anse1㎡an　or　Cartesim　Ploof　the
question　is　not　whether　o血y　or　contingent　eXistence　coUld　ever　be　derivable　fU）m　the
mere　concept　of　a　kmd　of血in＆　but　only　whether　a㎡（lqely　excellent　kmd　of　eXistence，
necessary　eXistence，　can　be　derived　from　a　unique　concepち　tliat　of　divine　pe㎡eCtion　or
Goodness”（AD，225）．　That　is　tr）say，　it　should　be　stated愈om　my　position血at　the　tlue
question　is　whether　the　loyal　God，　implied　in　the　Name　of　G（xd，　can　paradoXically　appear
as　the　evocative　God，　not　the　Kantian　question　as　to　the　derivability　of　contingent
OXistence　fbom　the　merae◎oncept　ofa　Being．
Maii血Luther，　LectUres　on　Romans，　cd．　W．　Pauck（Philadelphia：The　Westm虚ns愉Press，
1961），p．67；hereafter　cited　as　LR．
Rud　D】fHenna叫（｝esanswe〃e　sndien　ZZtr　77ieologi’e　LutheT　s　u．1～eformation（（貰｝t血gen：
Vendenhoeck＆Rμp彊echち1960），　pp．　l　l－43．
See　TokiyUICi　NobUliara，”Toward　a　Global　Hemleneutic　of　Justification　in　Process
Perspective：Luther　and　Shinran　Comaparatively　Considered，”Buddhist－Christian
Sndi’es　l2（1992），103－20，　e町｝．，106．
Gregory　Schu丘eider，　An　lntroduction　to　Ansel〃i’s．Argument（Philadelphia：Temple
University　Press，1978），　p．79；he爬：after　citecl　as　IA、A．
See　charles　Hartshorne，　the　Logic　ofp勿fection（Lasa皿e，　ILL：　QPen　court　Publ．　co．，
1962），p．8．
See　Proceedings　of　the　Mr　lntern．（加9．　For　the　HiSt．　ofReligt’ons（rokyo：M㎞鵬
1960），pp．223－228．　Also閃An　I！1q両In重o　t　le　Basic　Structure　of　Christian　Thoughち”
Rε1⑫α偲＆磁゜es　in　Japan（Tokyo：Ma職1959），　pp．418－419．
Cf：”Laiiguage　helps　reality　tO　itS　t耐h．　Ih伽重h，s　View　it　is　the　pOssible　that　helps　the
Iea1【◎ome】li血guistica皿y　tO　itS　tluth　and　thus’　expresses　itSelf　as　itself，　i．e．，　as　what　is
b㏄om直ng”（Emst　Fuchs，　Hermeneutik，　Bad　Cannstadt：Muenerscho恥1954，　p．211；cited
in　James　M．　Robinson，　A　New　euest　of　the　Historical　Jesus　and　Other」Essの2s，
32
　　　Ph皿adelphia：Fortress　Press，1983，　P．207）．
22　Anselmi　Cρpera（）mnia，　vo1．1，　pp．93－94；cited　j血LへA，108．　Cf：1，＿［these　pages］it
　　　secms　to　me血dicated　that　the　sole　pu叩ose　of　wridng　these　workS　and　circUla血皇g　them
　　　among｛he・hrethren　was　to　assist止e・monks・With・their・medi倣ion．　ln　this　connection，　I
　　　might　mention　that　the　account　1　am　offering　here　shoUld　scrve　tr）負U　out　the　significmce
　　　of血e，輌舳aw曲m血e　w㏄ldl　c㎞㎞甜c　of㎜dc㎞”（IAへ108）．
23　D．T．　Suzuld，　Stucii°es　in　Ztnz，　ed．，　With　a　fm　word　by　Christrnas　Humphreys，　New　Yorl（：
　　　Dell　PUbl．　Co．，1978，　ch．　IV．”Reason　and　hltuition　ill　Buddhist　Philosophy，”p．85；
　　　hereafter　cited　as　SZ．　This　essay　is励【en丘om、Essays　in　East－Vaest・PhilosopkEv，　mited
　　　by　Chades　A．　Moore，　and　pUbhshed　by止e　University　of　Hawaii　Press，　HonoM煽皿
　　　1951．H㎜幽s　no舳t”【i］t捻麟瓠by㎜y闘o㏄of血e鰍st　wo曲evロ
　　　prOduced　by　1血e　au血or四（SZ，10）．
24　Daisetz　T．　Suzuki，　Zen　and加ese　Culture（New　Yod（：Prince敦m　University　Piess，
　　　1970），p．241；he臓after　cind　as　nC．　The　background　of　Basho曾s　writing　the　haiku　poeni
　　　血question　was　an　exchange　of　questions　and　answers，㎜ely，　mondo．　Wh㎝舳ho
　　　was　stUdyipg　Zen　under　his　master　Buocho，　Buocho　one　day　paid　him　a　visit　and　asked，
　　　1，How　ale　yσu　get血1g　on　lhese　days？”　Basho　said，”A丘er　the　rec㎝nt】面n　the　mo6s　has
　　　gmwn　g爬ener　tllan　ever．「l　Buccho　shot　a　second　arrow　to　see出e　depths　of　Basho，s
　　　understanding　of　Zen，”What　Buddhism　is　there　even　befbre　the　moss　has　grown
　　　gre㎝er？”Basho’s　Imswer　was，”A丘on　jumps　into　the　water，　and　hear　the　sound！°1
　　　Basho，s　answer　at　the　t㎞e　it　was　utteled　did　not　have　the　first　line，　llthe　old　pon¢”
　　　whic転　it　is　reported，　he　added　later　on　tO　make　a　complete　haiku　of　seventeen【syllables．
　　　See　ZJC，239．
25Cf：”Therefore　we　alwIΨs㎝cou血ter　the　absolute　in　our　own　self－negation，　reflecting　the
　　　paradox【or，　more　correctly，　inverse　correspondence］of　God”；”The　self　always
　　　encounters　the　absolute　as　the　paradox［or，　more　preciSely，　inverse　com∋spond㎝ce】of
　　　God　hhnself－｛bat　is，　as　the　self－negation　of　the　absolute　One’1（Kitaro　Nishi（セ』Last
　　　職だπ85」ハlothingne，∬and〃診e、Religt’ozLs〃”orldview，伽s．輌血an血trOd．　David　A．
　　　D皿worth，　Honoh血：University　of　Hawaii　Press，1987，　pp．94－95）．　Dilwo曲takes　the
　　　Japanese　advelb”gyakutaioo　teke’　ni”，（literally　mea㎡11g”jnversely　com∋spondingly”）to
　　　mean，　and　theref（）re　translates　it　as，”paladox．”My　ow血use　of　the　expression”jnveIse
　　　correlation　or　corTespondence”is　a　resUlt　of　my　own　theology　of　loyalty，　as　is　cleady
　　　observable　in　the　text．　In　Nishida，s　case，　the　idea　of四inverse　correspondence，l
　　　presupposes　what　I　might　call　the　metaphysics　of　ultimate　reversion，　which　is
　　　exemplified　in　Nishida書s　fbllowing　passage：”A　true註bsolute　must　possess　itse『throuεh
　　　self－negation．．　The　true　absolute　exists　in　that　it　returns　to　itself　in　the　fbrm　of　the
　　　leladve，曾（il）id．，　p．67）．
26　Luther　writes　of　Psalm　70　as　follows：”The　justice　of　GOd　is　all　this：tr）abase　oneself　to
　　　血le　utter　loSt［5的θ試ηρπ画蜘加htoniliare】and血is　p聯rly　Ch盛st　expresses　here．　For
　　　he　iS　the　POvver　and　justice　of　GOd　through　his　uttermost　and　deqpest　humility”（Martin
　　　Luther，加漉｛那物舵，　We㎞r　Ausgabe，　Wehnar：Boehlau，　1938，3：458．407，465．1．
　　　33；quoted　in　G．　Rupp，　The　Righteousne∬of　God：，乙uther　Studies，　New　York；
　　　Philosophical　Library，1953，　p．135）．
33
27”Gladly　a　sinner　that　thou　mayest　be　justified血me匹ibenterpeccator　ut　tu　iusnjt7ceris　in
　　　膨】”（Ma血1　Luther，　Lec加”es　on　Romans，　ed．　W．　Pauc瓦　Philadelphia：Westminster
　　　Press，1961，pp．7－－71）．
28R㎝em厩血this　ngad　Jesus’admo面on：”Th｛refore　do　not　worry　I畑t伽oπow，
　　　fbr　tomorrow　will　worry　about　its　own　things°1（Matt．6：34）．　Of　course，　the　real
　　　implication　of”tomorrow”is　not　just　literal；it　rather　signifies　the　neamess　of　the
　　　Uhknowable　ill　our　lifヒ．　Cf．　the　mondo　1　and　2　above，
29　This　means　that　Emptiness　emptying　itself　lying　between　the　Deity　and　us　is　the
　　　imermoSt　ontOlogica1　core　of　the血ndamenU　1　tr｝getherness　of　the　Deity　With　us，　or　of
　　　what　Katsumi　Takizawa（）alls血e　P肋適c鰭㎞mlmue1．　One　camot　s㎞ply曲k　of
　　　Empiness　as　a　Buddhist　way　of　being　awa】（ened　to　the　Protthfact吻n　hnmanue1．　For　i11
　　　血scase，　no　pmper　philo…脚hical　mdeIstandng　of　the　PrOto－factum　lmmanuel　in　itself
　　　is　proVided血acon血cing　mamer』he㎞血of血e㎜鰍is止e　o出er　way　round．
　　　Without血㎞kjng　o伽logica皿y　in血e　manner　1　mentioned　abOve，　we　would　not　be　Iめle
　　　to　q）isteniologically　t面ve　at　the　power　of　awakening，　which　I㈱．　in　God　as　he　is
　　　evocadvely　near叙）us．　According　tO　my　theology　of　loya晦「，　it　is　essential　that（1）sh1㏄
　　　God　is　loyal　to（2）Emptiness　empty血g　itse1£（3）God　can　and　does　actually　evoke
　　　loyalty　in　us　creatures　in　the　capacity　of　the　voice　of　voiceless　Emptiness．　When
　　　Whitehead　designates　God　as　the”outcome　of　creativity，111notice　a　parallel
　　　hermeneutical　concern　at　worl（．　See　Alfred　No曲Whitehead，　Pllrocess　and　Reality，
　　　Correcnd　OUtioq　eds．　David　R．　Gd伍n　and　Donald　W．　Sherbume（New　Yofk：The　F1㏄
　　　Press，1978），　p．88：，°This　iS　the　conception　of　God　aocording　to　which　he　is　considered
　　　as　the　outcome　of　creativity，　as　the　fbundation　of　order，　and　as　the　goad　towards
　　　novehy．”
30　At　this　stage　it　can　fairly　be　said　that　we　are　now　going　beyond　Hartshorne曾s　position　of
　　　the　derivabihty　of　necessary　existen㏄丘）m　a　1血que　concepち　that　of　divine　perfection　or
　　　Gfea血1ess－namely，　the　posidon丘om　Which　he　repu（hates　Ka皿t，s　pOsition　of　deriying　the
　　　derivability　of　conting㎝t　existence　fk）m　the　mere　concept　of　a　Behlg．　Ours　is　the
　　　position　of　put血g　fbrward　the　Div血e　inclusion　of　contingent　as　well　as　n㏄essaτy
　　　eXistence　in　the　development　of　the　Proof　of　（［iOd，s　EXistence　as　it　goes　from　essentia　tO
　　　esse　tO薦彪ns－and　all　this　due　to　the　Divhle　loyalty　to　the　Nothhlgness　Greater【nih’1
　　　maitLs］as　conta血ed　in　the　Name　of　God　as　aliqu’d　quo　nihil　maitLsωg吻r’possit
　　　（Some面ng　beyond　which　No血ing　Grea加r　can　be　conceived）．　C£n．14．
31　Personally，　it　is　impOrtant　tO　me　th就Icame　to　pmve　the　truthfi』ness　of　my　teacher
　　　Katsumi　Takizawals　theory　of　the　Protoプfactu〃11mmanuel　through　this　study　of
　　　Anselm’s　a㎎gument　with　D．　T．　Suzuld，s　Zeri　insight　as　guide．　What　is　pivotal　hl　my　own
　　　wotk　of　the　rmnf　is　that　I　took　the　No曲g　G㎜麓r［励’1脚醐in　Anse㎞，s　Name　of
　　　God　to　mean　Buddhist　Empiness　as　it　empties　itself　as　a　obncepちthus　tumlng　itself　into
　　　that　which　lies　between　GOd　and　creatUres，　which　po血ts　to　the　auth㎝tici重y　of　what
　　　Takizawa　designates　as　the’，Proto如m　lnrmanuel．閃Yet，　it　seems　to　me　that
　　　Takizawa　usually　doesn’t　refer　tO　Buddhist　Empthless　as　the　inner　core　of　the　Proto－
　　　factum　IMmanuel．　Ra止er，　he　identifies　what　his　mentr｝r　Kitaro　Nishida　calls止e　seif－
　　　identity　of　absolu重e　oontradic㎞es　q）n．，　zettai　muj’〃η㈱ノt’kO　dooitsu），　which　jll　Ni血da
34
　　　standS　fbr　Buddhist　Emp血ess，　With　the　botafactz”n　IMmanuel　which　he　has　leamed
　　　丘om　Kad　Ba曲．　His　attainment　of　a　fUndamental　philosophical　conViction（㎜皿Ted，　he
　　　thoughち　in　enVisaging　these　tWo　expressi，ons　of　Reality　by　his　tWo　mentOrs　as　signifying
　　　one　and　the　same　Reahty．　However，　what　1　have　attempted　to　show　hl　this　essay　is　a
　　　different　approach　toward　Takizawa’s　philosophical　achievement．　I　do　not　identify
　　　Bud‘血St　Emptiriess　v舳the　・ptOt“fa・鰍㎞㎜uel；rather，　1　regard　the　former　as止e
　　　tmer　core　of　the　latter．　Only血mu帥面s卿m㏄h　I　came　along舳Anselm　to　arrive
　　　at　tlie　proof　of　the　EXistence　of　God°1with　us．，l　Yeちin　this　approach　1　was　intendng　tO
　　　vivify　Takizawa曾s　another　expression　appea㎡ng　as　early　as　1936　in　Fundamental
　　　Problems　inハlishida　’s、Philos（）phy（Tokyo：Toe　Shobo，1936；new　edition，　Tokyo：
　　　Kobushi　Sh6bo，2004）：”A皿that　actually　eXistS　is　irnrnediately　f乞ced　with　absolute　Be血g
　　　（i．e．，　G（虹）㎞u帥血m｛）dium　of　ahsolute　Nihil（i．e．，　Emp血ess）”Φ．38－39）．　T血しwa
　　　explahls　this　state　of　affairs　in　terms　of　Nishida曾s　idea　of”conimUity　hl　dis◎ont㎞uity1曾
　　　（Jpn．，　hirenzoku　no　renzoku）．　For　my　discussion　of　the　distinction　betW㏄en　Nishida曾s
　　　standpohlt　of　uni電y　of　opposites　and　Takizawa電s　notion　of　the　hoto－fncttan　Immanuel，
　　　see　my　anicle’”Su）mat駕K㎝osis，　and　J血i　or　Friendly　Compassionate　Love：Towald　a
　　　Buddhist－Christiaii　Theology　of　Loyaltジ（1（mpnese　Re”gI’ons，15！4，　July　l　989），50－66．
32C£：1曾刑s肋f　is　w㎞is圃ly　and　irnmediately　given　to　our　consciousness．　It鰐
　　　be　called　hmdifferentiated　con血u㎜曾，　tO　use　Mr．　No血opls　term．　To　the　Western　mind，
　　　，conti皿uum，　may　be　better　than　sunayata，　though　it　is　likely　to　be　misintelpreted　as
　　　some曲g，o切ecdvely，　existing　and　apprehensible　by吻ana．　In　the’cont血u㎜’
　　　㎞融1y醜howev鉱，　there　is　no　diff｛rmtiation　of　subject　and　objecちof撫r
　　　and　the　se㎝．　It　is　the　’old　mirrof｛that　has　not　yet　been　polished，　and　therefore　no　world
　　　of　mUltiplicities　is　reflecrted　in　the’mirror’．　It　is　the　P血）ary　Man，　in　whom　neither　flesh
　　　nor　bOnes　are　left　and　yet　Who　can　reveal　himself　not　only　to　his　parents　but　to　all　his．
　　　brothers，　non－sentient　as　well　as　sentient．　It　is　lthe　f紬er’　whose　age　is　not　calcUlable　by
　　　means　of　numbers　and　therefbre　to　whom　everything　is　a，grandchild’of
　　　conceptUaliZation．　It　is　Hves　with」p吻吻in血e　absolute　state　of　quiescen㏄，　in　which　llo
　　　polarization　has　taken　place．　It　theref（）re　eludes　our　eff（）rts　to　bring　it　out　to　the
　　　disc血血nIめle　su血ce　of　consciousness．　We　cannot　speak　of　it　as　’being，　or　as，non－
　　　be㎞gl．　The　categories　created　by　ratiocination　are　not　at　all　applicable　here．　If　we
　　　atmpt　tO　wake　it丘om　the　eterna1　silence　of’neti，　neが（not　this，　not　this）we　’murder’iち
　　　and　what　Vi　’nana　perceives　is　a．moSt　mercilessly　mUltilated　co叩se’1（SZ，119－120）．
33　Let　me　show　this　state　of　affairs　by　referenoe　tt）Anse㎞゜s　crucial，　second　tr）the　last重cxt
　　　in　IV：曾’For　GOd　is　’that　beyond　which　nothing　greater　can　be　conceived’．　Whoever［1］
　　　truly　knows　that［2］㎞ows　t㎞it　exists　in　s㏄h　a　way伽t　ev㎝in　thought　it　camot　but
　　　exist．　And　so　whoever　knows　that　this　is　the　manner　of　GOd’s　existence　camot【3】
　　　conceive　hirn　as　not　c”cis血9サ1（AFQI，168）．　Here　we　have　t㎞ree　stages　of　knowing　or
　　　conceiVing　at　worl（hl　Anse㎞曾s㎎ument：the丘rst　stage　of　truly　knoWing【1］standS　for
　　　the　intUitive　knowledge　of　the　Name　of（週；出e　s㏄ond　stage　of㎞owing【2】pOintS　to
　　　血efimction　of　reason　i皿◎onf（）rmation　to　what　appears　j血the　filst　stage；and　the曲d
　　　stage（”cannot　conoeive　hini　as　not　eXisdng”）［3］refers　tO　the　mOde　ofGOd’s　EXistence　as
　　　it　jnsq）arably－appears　tO　the　knower，　thus　showing血t　God　is　llwitb”㎞，　which　is
35
　　　nothing　but血1e　execmion　of　the　proof．　As　is　clear　here，　the　Pmof　of　the　Exis血㏄of
　　　GOd　is　neither　a　men∋ly　intrarnenta1　nor　a　merely　extramental　evenちbut　is　an　inter－
　　　subjective，　relational　event．　As鋤c垣t　woUd比co㎜㎝u㈱舳止e　q㎜㎞一
　　　mechanical　trutll　to　the　effect　that”an　experimenter　is　part　of　the　experimental
　　　appa耐us．”You　canllot血ink　of　the　apparatus　per　se　apart丘om　the　expe血1enter　wi止血
　　　it　By　the　same　tok㎝』you　cannot血ink　of　the　Existence　of　God　per　se　apart　ftom　one
　　　who　is　invoIved　in　the　aigumenちAnselm，　either．　At　any㈱，　at　this囲stage　it　can
　　　fa血1y　be　said　that　reason　as　the　way　to　the　vision　of　God　is　accomplished．　Anse㎞゜s
　　　con卿lation　is負】1filled．
34　Cf　n．31　abOve．
